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A SPECTRUM THEORY OF
NEGOTIABILITY
CuRTis NYQUIST*
The first law course I had a chance to teach was Bills and Notes.
Yale was very gentle with the unbroken colt: Bills and Notes
three times a week at 8 A.M.-and nothing else. And I had John
Edgerton's copy of Smith & Moore's Cases: "'My face is my for-
tune, Sir,' it said," was his observation on Miller v. Race. "Notes
make music, once you learn to play." That was inside the
cover .... "Why 'Equities'? It is the bfp who has the equities."
There was time and occasion to fall really in.love with the subject,
and I have never fallen out.
Karl Llewellyn1
Negotiable instruments scholarship rests on four interconnected and
largely untested propositions. Llewellyn, with an instinct for the jugular,
touches on three of them in his brief reminiscence. The other premise
has evolved in a handful of theoretical commercial paper articles pub-
lished over the past twenty-five years, and all four assumptions underlie
virtually the entire contemporary discourse on negotiable instruments.
"My face is my fortune." Negotiable instruments are seen to inhabit
a separate and exclusive enclave where basic principles of contract and
property law do not apply. Entrance to this domain is entirely a matter
of form. Documents satisfying the requirements of Article 3 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code2 gain admission. Documents failing the formal
tests are deemed "simple" contracts and relegated to rules of contract
assignment and property transfer that reduce their value to purchasers.
A corollary of the separate enclave premise is that negotiable instrument
principles are viewed as having limited applicability outside Article 3.
* Professor of Law at the New England School of Law. B.A., North Park College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Peter A. Alces, Joseph J. Beard, Judi Greenberg,
Tom Hervey, Duncan Kennedy, Michael K. McChrystal, Gary Monserud, Sarah Salter, Paul
Teich, and participants in a New England faculty lunch for helpful comments. I am also grate-
ful to the New England School of Law for the sabbatical that launched this project and the
University of Warwick Law School, Coventry, England for providing a sabbatical home.
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, Meet Negotiable Instruments, 44 COLUM. L. Rv. 299, 299 (1944).
2. American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Commercial Code: 1990 Official Text with Comments [hereinafter U.C.C.].
The negotiability requirements are spelled out in U.C.C. §§ 3-104, 3-106, 3-108, 3-109, 3-112,
3-113.
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"Notes make music, once you learn to play." Negotiable instruments
statutes have invariably preferred rigid rules over flexible standards.3
For the past one hundred years American negotiable instruments law
has been embodied in two successive rules-based uniform statutes; the
now antiquated Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and Article 3 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.4 Pursuing Llewellyn's music analogy,
the drafters of Article 3 deployed an intricate twelve-tone scale, and
"learning to play" can be a daunting task.5 Moreover, the structure of
Article 3 contributes to rigid either/or thinking about negotiable instru-
ments. In Article 3 an instrument is either negotiable or it is not. Nego-
tiable instruments are either promises or orders,6 payable on demand or
at a definite time,7 and payable to order or bearer.8 A holder of a nego-
tiable instrument is either a holder in due course or she is not.9 Disputes
involve either defenses10 or claims" or both.'2 Disappointed purchasers
3. For a discussion of the rules/standards dichotomy, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1685-701, 1710-13 (1976).
4. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was the first uniform act produced by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The N.I.L. was promulgated
in 1896 and adopted in all 48 states. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 2-3 (3d ed. 1988). The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted during
the 1940s, substantially revised during the mid-1950s, and by 1968 had been enacted in 49
states. The final state, Louisiana, enacted U.C.C. Articles 3 & 4 in 1974. See id. at 4-5. For
discussions of the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, see id. at 1-6; WILIAM TWIN-
ING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND =H REALIST MovEmENT 270-301 (1973). For a succinct analysis
of U.C.C. Articles 3 & 4 see ELLEN A. PETERS, A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS PRIMER (2d ed.
1974).
5. The intractability of commercial paper has found its way into popular literature:
'I went to Cairo, Illinois... bought an eating place called The Green Frog and married
a grass widow. It had one billiard table. We served ladies and men both, but mostly
men.'
'I didn't know you had a wife.'
'Well, I don't now. She taken a notion she wanted me to be a lawyer. Running a eating
place was too low-down for her. She bought a heavy book called Daniels on Negotiable
Instruments and set me to reading it. I never could get a grip on it. Old Daniels pinned
me every time. My drinking picked up and I commenced staying away two and three
days at a time with my friends.'
CHARLES PoRns, TRUE GRIT 98 (Penguin Books 1969)(1968).
6. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(6), (a)(9), 3-104(a). In section 3-104(e) promises are linked to notes
and orders to drafts.
7. U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a)(2), 3-108.
8. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(1).
9. U.C.C. § 3-302(a).
10. In U.C.C. Article 3 the term "defense" implies a cause of action in contract with the
defendant raising a defense based either on the underlying transaction (eg., duress, lack of
consideration, fraud, failure of consideration) or on a statutory discharge provision (eg., alter-
ation, § 3-407(b); payment, § 3-602(a); tender of payment, § 3-603(b); cancellation, § 3-604).
A "claim in recoupment" is similar to a failure of consideration defense, but is restricted to
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may have a cause of action either in contract 3 or warranty 14 or both.
Defenses to contract liability are either personal or real.' 5
The inflexible dualism of negotiable instruments logic contributes to
the view that most issues are resolvable by the application of predictable
rules: "[T]here is little room for the chancellor's foot to rotate in the law
of bills and notes."' 6 Furthermore, commercial paper literature seldom
investigates or even sees connections to other subjects.. Negotiable in-
struments law is viewed as self-contained and self-sufficient. Similarly,
non-commercial paper legal scholarship shows little interest in negotia-
bility principles.
"It is the bfp who has the equities." It is conventional wisdom that a
transfer17 of property vests in the transferee only the right, title, and in-
terest of the transferor. As a consequence, a transferee takes a position
no better than her transferor. An assignee of rights under a simple con-
tract takes subject to all defenses and claims that would be effective
against the assignor. This "same as" position is seen as a fundamental
and almost inviolable principle-as natural as water seeking its own
level. A holder in due course, on the other hand, can take a position that
is better than his transferor. A holder in due course takes free of all
claims to the instrument and most defenses.' Holder in due course
cases in which the defective performance is accepted by the obligor, who then has an obliga-
tion to pay but also has a cause of action for breach of warranty. See U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(3),
cmt. 3.
11. In Article 3 the term claim refers to a property or possessory right and includes a right
arising out of recision to recover an instrument issued or transferred. See U.C.C. § 3-202(b),
3-306.
12. For example, a theft of a negotiable instrument gives rise both to a conversion claim
and a defense to contract liability. U.C.C. §§ 3-305(c), 3-420.
13. The nature of U.C.C. Article 3 contract liability depends on the capacity in which the
obligor signs the instrument: issuer of a note, cashier's check, or other draft drawn on the
drawer, § 3-412; acceptor, § 3-413; drawer, § 3-414; or indorser, § 3-415.
14. U.C.C. § 3-416.
15. Although the terms "real defense" and "personal defense" do not appear in Article 3,
they are in general use in the literature and court opinions. The real defenses implement
important policies that outweigh negotiability policies and are available even against a holder
in due course. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1), (b). Personal defenses and claims in recoupment are
ineffective against a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2), (a)(3), 3-305(b).
16. Stream v. CBK Agronomics, Inc., 361 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (modifying
368 N.Y.S2d 20 (App. Div. 1975)), quoted in Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Princi-
ples Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 906, 927 n.76
(1978).
17. This article uses the term "transfer" as it is defined in the Bankruptcy Code: "every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or
parting with property or with an interest in property." 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1990).
18. Even a holder in due course takes subject to real defenses. See supra note 15.
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rights are considered an unnatural and extraordinary violation of the ba-
sic principle. In U.C.C. Article 3, water flows upstream.
The final premise of negotiable instrument scholarship has become
apparent in a succession of articles whose very titles leave little doubt
about the authors' opinions: Negotiability-Who Needs It?,19 The Good
Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of
a Repentant Draftsman,2" Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instru-
ments,2 ' The Holder in Due Course and Other Anachronisms in Con-
sumer Credit,' The Last Nail in the Coffin of the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine,2 3 and Codification of Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale of
Reiterated Anachronism 4
This scholarship is based on the proposition that negotiability serves
a single policy. It argues that the "better than" position evolved in the
nineteenth century to encourage commercial transactions in negotiable
instruments and similar documents.2 5 A better than position enhances
the price purchasers will be willing to pay by eliminating the need to
discount for the possibility of claims and defenses. A holder in due
course is subject only to the problems arising from her particular trans-
action of purchase, a transaction over which she has control and whose
details she knows. Problems arising out of prior transactions, whether
the initial issuance of the instrument or transfers subsequent to issuance,
are of no concern except to the extent they give rise to real defenses.
It is further argued that the negotiability principle would have been
abandoned in the late nineteenth century except for the "apparent acci-
dent of codification. '2 6 The Negotiable Instruments Law and Uniform
Commercial Code perpetuated an archaic and exhausted concept that,
although wounded, is still dangerous when applied to modern transac-
tions. Negotiability operates to cut off legitimate consumer defenses, 7
19. Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 375 (1971).
20. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605 (1981).
21. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 441 (1979).
22. Vern Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other Anachronisms in Consumer
Credit, 52 Thx. L. REv. 1 (1973).
23. Leroy Randolph, Jr. & Douglas Whitman, The Last Nail in the Coffin of the Holder in
Due Course Doctrine, 14 AM. Bus. LAw. J. 311 (1977).
24. M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated
Anachronism, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 625 (1990).
25. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 20, at 610.
26. Gilmore, supra note 21, at 456.
27. See generally Countryman, supra note 22; Gilmore, supra note 20; Sinclair, supra note
[Vol. 78:897
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confers on banks undeserved fights against third parties,28 and is gener-
ally seen to place the weak at the mercy of the strong.
This Article examines all four assumptions: that the negotiability
principle inhabits a special enclave, is rigidly dualistic, is self-contained,
and promotes a single antiquated policy. Part I argues that the negotia-
bility concept 9 is one of the fundamental ways of thinking about trans-
fers of property and a "better than" position is an option generally
available to courts and legislatures. While a "better than" position may
not be chosen in a particular case or statutory section, it is more widely
used than the literature recognizes. Moreover, negotiability is not rigidly
dualistic with alternatives limited to a "same as" position or full holder
in due course rights. Instead, the negotiability principle offers an entire
spectrum of possibilities-from positions only marginally better than
"same as," through numerous intermediate positions, to a full Article 3
holder in due course position, and then beyond, to negotiability positions
even more radical than those found in U.C.C. Article 3. The negotiabil-
ity principle displays flexibility, diversity, and subtlety, and is so firmly
imbedded in the idea of transfer it often goes unnoticed.
Part II explores one of the major symptoms of commercial paper
scholarship's inflexible dualism. While the literature has devoted tre-
mendous energy explicating holder in due course rights and contrasting
those rights with a "same as" position, it has entirely failed to explore a
third alternative: the transferee might take a position that is worse than
her transferor. A "worse than" position displays a range of possibilities
similar to the negotiability spectrum, from outright prohibitions of trans-
fer to positions only marginally less than a "same as" position. The
28. Rosenthal argues that since depositary banks rely almost exclusively on their custom-
ers in establishing accounts and taking items for deposit, granting holder in due course status
to banks gives them windfall rights against drawers. Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 385, 392-94.
29. This article uses the term negotiability to refer to the principle that a transferee can
receive a right, title, or interest that is better than the transferor's right, title, or interest. In
U.C.C. Article 3 the principal application of the negotiability concept is found in holder in due
course rights. These rights are generally contrasted with rights received when a simple con-
tract is assigned. Article 3 has, however, other advantages versus the assignment of contract
rights: strategic advantages in litigation, § 3-308; the merger doctrine, which clarifies issues
related to assignment, claims, and payment, § 3-310; contract rights against prior assignors
based on indorsement, § 3-415; warranty rights against prior transferors, § 3-416; a generous
statute of limitations, § 3-118; rights to compel an indorsement creating contract liability even
in the absence of agreement, § 3-203(c); and generally, a statutory rather than a common law
scheme for analyzing disputes. For a discussion of some of these points under the N.I.L., see
Grant Gilmore, The CommercialDoctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1063-68
(1954).
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"worse than" alternative is in many ways as important as negotiability
and demonstrates a comparable richness and variety.
Part III demonstrates that negotiability, far from being self-con-
tained, developed in an atmosphere of borrowing and reverse-borrowing
across property lines. Analogies to goods, bank notes, and coin were
particularly important. Furthermore, negotiable instruments law still ex-
ists as part of a complex network with numerous connections to other
types of property. The negotiability principle is not, nor has it ever been,
restricted to negotiable instruments. A general failure to recognize this
network of connections has produced peculiar anomalies such as negoti-
able instruments being treated as less negotiable than other kinds of
property3° and documents being first banished from Article 3 and then
readmitted with little thought to the consequences.3 '
The "same as" position is neither natural nor fundamental-it is con-
structed like any other legal principle. It is no more nor less important
than the "better than" and "worse than" alternatives. It is often either
ignored or unseen and in many instances it appears as mere argument
joined to a "better than" or "worse than" counterargument.
Throughout, this Article claims that negotiability serves not one pol-
icy but many policies. While negotiability clearly can have disastrous
consequences for consumers, it can also protect consumers, 2 guard
against secret liens,33 defend the integrity of a filing system, 4 encourage
ordinary course transactions in goods,35 speed bank collections and pay-
ments,36 and even insulate Samuel Williston from tax liability for the
interest coupons he gave as gifts to his daughter during the Christmases
of 1934 and 1935. 37 Negotiability cannot be identified with a single inter-
30. See infra notes 110-13, 116-17, 126, 156-58, 248, 260 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
32. U.C.C. §§ 9-103(2)(d), 9-307(2). In his consumer credit article, Vern Countryman ob-
serves, "But all human beings who obtain credit, other than for the purposes of a business in
which they are engaged, are consumers. In short, we are all consumers at least part of the
time." Countryman, supra note 22, at 17. For a discussion of section 9-103(2)(d) see infra
notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 90-98.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 90-98.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 161-64.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 257-60.
37. Commissioner of Corporation & Taxation v. Williston, 54 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1944).
Williston detached bearer interest coupons from corporate bonds he owned and gave them to
his daughter, who was a New York resident. The coupons matured in the years following the
gifts, 1935 and 1936 respectively, and the Massachusetts Commissioner assessed an income tax
for the amount of the interest. The court held that since the coupons were negotiable, title
passed to the daughter upon delivery and the tax should be abated. In dictum the court ina-
[Vol. 78:897
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est: it has been an ally and a foe of many interests. Negotiability is not a
closed system but rather a fundamental principle at work in many
systems.
Roland Barthes refers to the work of novelist Jean Cayrol as "litera-
ture at floor level"38 and proposes for its totem, the mouse which "deals
with things; it omits little on its way, concerned with everything its ob-
lique gaze, proceeding from the ground up, can encounter... a terres-
trial sliding, a sliding across of the floor."' 39 This description is equally
apt when applied to negotiable instruments scholarship-weaving its
way through Article 3 at floor level, turning left or right as it encounters
issues, but seldom elevating itself to gaze at the surrounding landscape
and the horizon. My hope is to gain some perspective on the negotiabil-
ity principle by moving off floor level.
I. A SPECTRUM THEORY OF NEGOTIABILITY
The whole "holder in due course" concept could usefully have
been abolished when negotiable instruments law was codified at
the end of the nineteenth century. In fact it was preserved like a
fly in amber both in the N.I.L. and in its successor, Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.n°
On the video monitor, they watched as he inserted a long needle
through the amber, into the thorax of the prehistoric fly. "If this
insect has any foreign blood cells, we may be able to extract them
and obtain paleo-DNA, the DNA of the extinct creature. We
won't know for sure, of course, until we extract whatever is in
there, replicate it, and test it. That is what we have been doing for
five years now. It has been a long, slow process-but it has paid
off."
' 4 1
plied the result would be different if a mere chose in action was being assigned. Id. at 45. For
a description of Williston's domestic life see SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW; AN AUTOBi-
OGRAPHY 167-82, 326-38 (1941).
38. ROLAND BARTHES, THE RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE 183 (1986).
39. Id. at 183-84.
40. GRA~r GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 108 n.18 (1974). Gilmore was so
pleased with the fly in amber metaphor that he used it again in Formalism and the Law of
Negotiable Instruments. Gilmore, supra note 21, at 461.
41. MICHAEL CRICHTON, JuRassic PARK 102 (1990). In Jurassic Park scientists build an
island theme park stocked with live dinosaurs. Things go wrong. If my characterization of the
negotiability principle is correct (Le., it is a fundamental way of thinking about transfers of
property rather than an arcane, antiquated concept), then negotiability not only survives but
flourishes. Attempting to eradicate negotiability would be, as Wittgenstein almost said, like
trying to put the fly back in the amber.
1995]
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There are three alternatives when property is transferred or contract
fights assigned: the transferee can take a better position, a same posi-
tion, or a worse position than her transferor. A "better than" position
means that the transferee takes free of one or more defenses or claims
that would be effective against the transferor. A "same as" position re-
sults from a transfer in which the transferee takes a position identical to
the transferor or "stands in the shoes" of the transferor. A "worse than"
position means that the transferee takes subject to a defense or claim
that would not have been effective against the transferor.
The archetypal "better than" position is a U.C.C. Article 3 holder in
due course. For example, A signs a promissory note as maker and issues
the note to B. When B sues A, any defense or claim arising out of the
transaction underlying the issuance of the note would be effective
against B.42 However, if B negotiates the note to C and C qualifies as a
holder in due course, when C sues A all claims and personal defenses
arising out of the transaction between A and B would be ineffective
against C. Therefore, in the transfer of the note from B to C, C takes a
position that is better than the position of B.
A "same as" position, sometimes referred to as the shelter rule, gives
the transferee a right, title, and interest that is identical to the transferor.
In U.C.C. Article 3, "[t]ransfer of an instrument ... vests in the trans-
feree any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument ... ."43 In the
previous hypothetical, if C does not qualify as a holder in due course she
is relegated to the shelter rule, takes a position identical to B, and is
subject to all defenses and claims effective against B. The shelter rule
also means that a party who does qualify as a holder in due course can
pass those rights by transfer.
A "worse than" position is illustrated in U.C.C. section 3-203(b),
which creates an exception to Article 3's shelter rule. If the transferee
"engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument,"' he is disquali-
fied from taking holder in due course rights from the transferor. Such a
transferee obviously could not qualify as a holder in due course on his
own.45 But if his transferor has holder in due course rights, a transferee
engaging in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument is also disqualified
from taking his transferor's rights under the shelter rule. The comment
42. B's cause of action against A would be on a contract theory under U.C.C. § 3-412.
43. U.C.C. § 3-203(b).
44. Id.
45. A transferee who "engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument" would not
take in good faith and also would take with notice of a defense and with notice of a claim.
U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2).
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to section 3-203 explains that the exception is created so that such a
party cannot "wash the instrument clean by passing it into the hands of a
holder in due course and then repurchasing it."46 In the hypothetical, if
B had engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument and then
transferred the note to C, who qualified as a holder in due course, and B
subsequently reacquired the note from C, B would take subject to all of
A's claims and defenses. In the transfer from C to B, B takes a position
worse than C.
This article will not discuss transfers that lead to a better or worse
position in a purely pragmatic sense. For example, an old negotiable
instruments adage holds that "the more indorsements, the better the
bill." 47 When A signs a note as maker and issues it to B, B has a cause of
action against only one party, A, and the cause of action is contract.48 If
B negotiates the note to C by unqualified indorsement 49 and receives
consideration, C will have rights both against A as maker and against B
on theories of indorsement contract50 and transfer warranty.51 If C ne-
gotiates the note to D by unqualified indorsement and receives consider-
ation, D would have rights against three parties and so on.
Pragmatically, the more defendants the better the position. This im-
provement in position occurs, however, whether or not any of the trans-
ferees is a holder in due course and is distinct from the question of
claims and defenses. Other purely pragmatic differences arising from
transfer, such as the differing levels of involvement in and knowledge of
the original transaction by the transferee and, in litigation, the parties'
differing resources and levels of risk aversion, also will not be addressed.
In addition, this Article will not consider changes that occur to a
party's position without a transfer. A party holding property of any
type, including a negotiable instrument, will find herself in different posi-
tions over time. Even a holder in due course 2 suffers adverse conse-
46. U.C.C. § 3-203 cmt. 2. Although the comment seems to limit the exception to reacqui-
sition cases, the statutory language is not so limited.
47. James Steven Rogers, The Myth of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. Rav. 265,303 (1990). See
also MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmmERcAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 223
(1977).
48. U.C.C. § 3-412.
49. An indorsement is unqualified if it does not disclaim contract liability by adding
"without recourse" or similar language. U.C.C. § 3-415(b). It is also possible to disclaim
transfer and presentment warranties on any instrument except a check. See U.C.C. §§ 3-
416(c), cmt. 5, 3-417(e), cmt. 7.
50. U.C.C. § 3-415.
51. U.C.C. § 3-416.
52. Holder in due course status is determined when a party becomes a holder and gives
value. See U.C.C. §§ 3-203(c), 3-302(a), (d), 3-303(a). While that status is not lost with the
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quences from holding an instrument too long or failing to give timely
notice. For example, holding an instrument beyond the due date dis-
charges indorsers from contract liability5 3 and failing to give notice of
dishonor may discharge liabilities both in indorsement contract and war-
ranty. 4 And ultimately, all rights are lost with the running of the statute
of limitations.55 There are numerous ways, quite apart from transfer, of
waking up on Tuesday morning with a right, title, or interest in property
that is worse than it was the night before.
A party's position can also improve with the passage of time. The
"forgotten notice" doctrine, for instance, allows a party to receive notice
of a claim or defense and later with the passage of time "forget" the
notice was received. 6 A person who could not have qualified as a
holder in due course in February might be eligible if he purchases the
instrument in August.57 In U.C.C. Article 9, several sections operate to
improve the priority position of a purchaser58 if a competing secured
party with priority fails to act in a timely fashion. For instance, if a
debtor moves collateral5 9 from one state to another and the collateral is
kept in the destination state for four months, security interests perfected
in the state of origin become unperfected unless action is taken to per-
passage of time, it does not protect a holder in due course from the consequences of holding
the instrument past its due date or failing to give a timely notice.
53. U.C.C. §§ 3-415(a), (e).
54. U.C.C. §§ 3-415(c), 3-416(c), 3-417(e).
55. U.C.C. § 3-118.
56. The U.C.C. defers to the common law of each state on the issue of the validity of the
forgotten notice doctrine: "The time and circumstances under which a notice or notification
may cease to be effective are not determined by this Act." U.C.C. § 1-201(25).
57. In Lord v. A. & J.F. Wilkinson, 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 593 (Barb. 1870), one of the defend-
ants was informed on February 9 of the theft of U.S. government notes and given a handbill
describing the notes. The defendants purchased one of the stolen notes on February 14 and
another on August 14. A jury instruction stating "the defendants once having notice, are
bound by it" was held improper since it did not allow for the possibility the notice might have
been forgotten. Id. at 596-97.
58. Although in ordinary usage the terms "purchase" and "buy" are interchangeable, the
U.C.C. gives "purchase" a very broad definition: "'Purchase' includes taking by sale, dis-
count, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary trans-
action creating an interest in property." U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
59. The multistate rule discussed here applies to documents, instruments, and ordinary
goods. U.C.C. § 9-103(1). Although "document" and "instrument" are terms defined in the
U.C.C., "ordinary goods" is not. Ordinary goods, by a process of elimination, are goods which
are neither mobile goods (U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b)) nor goods covered by a certificate of title
issued by a state "under the law of which indication of a security interest on the certificate is
required as a condition of perfection." U.C.C. § 9-103(2)(a). Rules that function in a way
similar to § 9-103(1)(d)(i) are found in §§ 9-103(3)(e) and 9-403(2).
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fect the interest in the destination state.60 Furthermore, the interest is
"deemed to have been unperfected as against a person who became a
purchaser after removal. ' 61 A secured party taking an interest in collat-
eral or a party buying collateral within the four month grace period can
improve from a junior to a senior priority position with the mere passage
of time.62
If this Article were expanded to include purely pragmatic changes
arising from transfer and changes that occur without transfer, the entire
concept of a transferee taking a position that was identical to the posi-
tion of her transferor would fade like mist on a summer's morn. The
discussion will focus exclusively on changes in right, title, or interest re-
sulting from transfer.
This Article argues that there is an entire spectrum of "better than"
positions; a spectrum that reaches from positions only marginally better
than "same as" to points beyond holder in due course. "Worse than"
positions are also arrayed along a spectrum. The possibilities arising
from transfer are analogous to a number line displaying negative and
positive integers from -10 to +10. A "same as" position would be lo-
cated at 0. Holder in due course rights would not be found at +10 but
rather at some intermediate position; perhaps at +8. Options on the
"better than" or negotiability scale would not be limited to either +8 or
0, but instead would occupy numerous points between 0 and +10. Out-
right prohibitions on transfer would be located at -10 and other "worse
than" positions would be found between -10 and 0. While it would be a
delusion to attempt mathematical precision on the question of the trans-
feree's right, title, and interest, a number line is a useful analogy for
thinking about the spectrum of possible positions.
There is, however, one kind of precision about transfers of property
that is absolutely essential but generally unrecognized in the literature.
It is important to be issue specific in analyzing the transferee's position.
It is entirely possible for a transferee to be in a better position on one
issue, in the same position on another issue, and in a worse position on a
third.63
Negotiability, or the possibility of a transferee taking a position bet-
ter than the transferor, is a fundamental and indispensable way of think-
60. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d)(i).
61. Ld.
62. Of course U.C.C. § 9-103 merely states whether the security interest is perfected or
unperfected. After the status of the interest is determined, a priority rule must be applied to
resolve the dispute. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 9-308, 9-312.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 353-58.
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ing about transfers of property. The literature occasionally recognizes
that negotiability plays a role outside U.C.C. Article 3, but it is usually a
narrow and limited recognition; as if negotiability had escaped from its
special enclave, inflicted some damage, but would soon be recaptured.
Negotiability is never seen as central to transfers except in Article 3.
Outside of Article 3, negotiability is viewed as an anomaly that imple-
ments some parochial policy in a specific area of law such as secured
transactions or sale of goods. And yet, a simple list of the different top-
ics and types of property discussed in the literature as having at least
some negotiability consequences begins, by its breadth, to undermine or-
thodox opinion: municipal bonds, 64 corporate bonds,65 chattel paper,66
credit card agreements,67 documents of title,68 principles of equity,69 in-
terest coupons,70 letters of credit,71 sale of goods,72 secured transac-
tions,73  securities, 74  real property,75  and trusts.76  The secured
64. George W. Peak, Negotiable Non-Negotiables, 30 Ky. L.J. 174 (1941).
65. Gilmore, supra note 29, at 1088-93; Roscoe Tbrner Steffen & Henry E. Russell, The
Negotiability of Corporate Bonds, 41 YALE L.J. 799 (1932).
66. Homer Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209 (1950).
67. Ralph J. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival
or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 503, 508-509 (1975); Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 400.
68. John F. Dolan, Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Inter-
play of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the UCC, 30 HAsTINGs L.J. 1 (1978); Grant Gilmore, The Com-
mercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1076-79 (1954); Robert A.
Riegert, The Rights of a Transferee of a Document of Title Who is Not a Holder By Due
Negotiation, 9 CutmB. L. REv. 27 (1978); Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 397-98; William D. War-
ren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L.
REv. 469, 482-87 (1963).
69. Henry W. Ballantine, Purchase For Value and Estoppel, 6 MINN. L. Rav. 87 (1922);
George P. Costigan, Jr., The Theory of Chancery in Protecting Against the Cestui Que Trust
One Who Purchases From a Trustee for Value and Without Notice, 12 CAL. L. Rlv. 356 (1924);
John S. Ewart, Negotiability and Estoppel, 16 L. Q. REv. 135 (1900); Rohner, supra note 67, at
509-11; Warren, supra note 68, at 481.
70. Note, Negotiability of Interest Coupons, 33 VA. L. REv. 80 (1947).
71. Gilmore, supra note 29, 1108-18.
72. Gilmore, supra note 20, at 616-19; Gilmore, supra note 29, at 1057-62; Rosenthal,
supra note 19, at 398; Warren, supra note 68, at 469-78.
73. Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PRons. 27, 46-47 (1951); Gilmore, supra note 20; Gilmore, supra note 29, at 1081-
88, 1102-07; Kripke, supra note 66; Randolph & Whitman, supra note 23, at 316; James S.
Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 197, 205-06 (1987);
Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 399.
74. Gilmore, supra note 29, at 1072-76; Rogers, supra note 73, at 207-08, 213-16; Rosen-
thal, supra note 19, at 398; Warren, supra note 68, at 487-92.
75. John S. Ewart, Priorities in Relation to Estoppel (pts. 1 & 2), 13 L. Q. REv. 46 (1897),
13 L. Q. REv. 144 (1897).
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transactions and sale of goods literatures, two samples from this list, il-
lustrate conventional wisdom about the negotiability principle.
A. Negotiability in U. C.C. Article 9
The secured transactions scholarship mentioning negotiability is par-
ticularly interesting since it includes the work of Grant Gilmore, one of
the principal drafters of Article 9.77 The scholarship creates the general
impression that negotiability has a very minor role to play in Article 9.
Most of the discussion arises from specific references to Article 3 in sec-
tions 9-206 and 9-309. Section 9-206 authorizes contract terms whereby
buyers or lessees agree not to assert "against an assignee any claim or
defense which he may have against the seller or lessor .... ,"T8 The as-
signee must satisfy requirements similar to the prerequisites for holder in
due course status, Article 3 real defenses are preserved, and section 9-
206 is made subject to consumer protection statutes and case law. Pre-
dictably this section, which Gilmore describes as following "a well-
blazed trail,' 79 is commonly included in consumer protection discussions
of the holder in due course doctrine.8 0 Section 9-309 clarifies that noth-
ing in Article 9 limits the rights of an Article 3 holder in due course (Le.,
since a security interest is a "claim" in Article 3 and a holder in due
course takes free of all claims, a holder in due course prevails over a
security interest, even a perfected interest).81
Other negotiability questions arise in the secured transactions litera-
ture because Article 9 creates a unified scheme for creating and perfect-
ing security interests in personal property, and negotiable instruments
are a type of personal property. 2 How is the free transferability philos-
ophy of Article 3 to be reconciled with the creation of security interests
76. J.B. Ames, Purchase For Value Without Notice, 1 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1887); Costigan,
supra note 69; Thaddeus D. Kenneson, Purchase For Value Without Notice, 23 YALE L.J. 193
(1914); W.A. Searey, Purchase For Value Without Notice, 23 YALE LJ. 447 (1914).
77. For comments of Gilmore's role in drafting Article 9, see TWINING, supra note 4, at
284, 292, 316, 318, and 460; Symposium, Origins and Evolution: Drafters Reflect Upon the
Uniform Commercial Code, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 535, 544, 551-55, 569, 578 (1982).
78. U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
79. Gilmore, supra note 73, at 46.
80. See eg., id at 46-47; Gilmore, supra note 73, at 1093-1102; Kripke, supra note 66, at
1209-22; Randolph & Whitman, supra note 23, at 316.
81. Section 9-309 also duplicates a provision in 3-302(b) stating that fling does not consti-
tute notice of the security interest. For a discussion of negotiability and § 9-309, see Dolan,
supra note 68, at 18-19.
82. Article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to cre-
ate a security interest in personal property or fixtures ... ." U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a). Article 9
also applies to a sale of accounts or chattel paper. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b).
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in commercial paper?8 If possession is to be the exclusive means of
perfecting a security interest in instruments, should exceptions be cre-
ated and what should the scope of those exceptions be? 4 Should chattel
paper8 5 be treated as fully negotiable or only partially negotiable? 86
Finally, in several articles Grant Gilmore confessed error in the draft-
ing of Article 9:
One of the ideas I took from Llewellyn's bounteous store was
that the good faith purchaser is always right and that the story of
his triumph was not only one of the most fascinating episodes in
our nineteenth-century legal history (which it was), but was also
one of continuing relevance for our own time (which, I have be-
latedly come to believe, it is not). 7
Surprisingly, however, Gilmore's list of good faith purchase topics in Ar-
ticle 9 is no broader than the rest of the literature except for an extended
discussion of accounts receivable financing in which he concludes that
Article 9 is too generous to the secured party.89 The secured transac-
tions literature completely fails to discuss or even recognize that the en-
tire Article 9 edifice is built on the negotiability principle.
Assume a debtor owns personal property in fee simple absolute. The
debtor applies for and receives a loan from a secured party (SP1) who
enters into a security agreement with the debtor, whereby an Article 9
security interest attaches.90 The debtor now holds the property subject
to an Article 9 security interest. If the debtor were only able to transfer
her right, title, and interest in the property, all transferees would take
subject to SPI's security interest. If she used the property as collateral
for a second secured loan, the secured party (SP2) would take subject to
SPI's interest. If she sold the property, the buyer would take subject to
SPF's interest. If a judgment were entered against the debtor and the
judgment creditor levied against the property, the levying creditor would
take subject to the interest. If the debtor filed for bankruptcy, SP1
83. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 73, at 205-06.
84. U.C.C. § 9-304(1).
85. Chattel paper is a hybrid document that evidences "both a monetary obligation and a
security interest in or lease of specific goods .... U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b). Chattel paper is
similar in concept to a negotiable instrument but does not qualify under Article 3 since it
contains more than a mere promise or order to pay money. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a).
86. Gilmore, supra note 29, at 1102-07; Kripke, supra note 66, at 1222-27.
87. Gilmore, supra note 20, at 605.
88. Id. at 620-28.
89. Id. at 62Z
90. The requirements for a security agreement to become effective (Le, attach) between
the parties and against the collateral are enumerated in U.C.C. § 9-203.
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would prevail over the interest of the bankruptcy trustee. If a "same as"
position prevailed in Article 9, SPI would take priority over any and all
transferees.
Of course Article 9 has a priority scheme that is nothing like the sim-
ple scheme just described. Article 9 implements a mixed bag of policies
and generally ignores the "same as" principle. Secured parties compete
under a first to file or perfect rule91 with a purchase money exception, 92
or if neither of the interests is perfected, the first interest to attach
prevails.93 Priority disputes between a secured party and a buyer are
addressed in seven different sections and subsections.94 Article 9 "lien
creditors,"95 a term including both a levying judgment creditor and a
bankruptcy trustee, take priority over unperfected interests,96 but
purchase money interests are awarded a ten-day grace period to file a
financing statement.97 All of the Article 9 priority rules are built on the
possibility that a debtor can transfer a position better than his own.
They assume that it is possible for a second secured party to have the
first bite of the apple, that a buyer can take free of an interest effective
against the seller, and that a lien creditor, although last, can be first. The
drafters of Article 9 were apparently so focused on the twin policies of
disclosing secret interests and protecting the integrity of the filing sys-
tem98 that they failed to notice that these policies are based on the possi-
bility that a debtor can transfer an interest in collateral better than his
own.
A recent case, Aircraft Trading and Services, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc.,99
which triggered an official reaction by the Permanent Editorial Board of
the Uniform Commercial Code, is symptomatic of this negotiability my-
opia. The facts of the case are summarized in the Permanent Editorial
Board Commentary:
91. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
92. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4). A purchase money security interest is:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to
enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so
used.
U.C.C. § 9-107.
93. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b).
94. U.C.C. §§ 9-103(2)(d); 9-301(1)(c); (d); 9-301(2); 9-307; 9-308; 9-309.
95. U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
96. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
97. U.C.C. § 9-301(2).
98. For discussion of the policies underlying the priority rules see §§ 9-101 cmt. 1, 9-301
cmt. 9, 9-302 cmt. 1, 9-312 cmt. 5.
99. 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
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A sold an aircraft engine to B and took back a purchase-money
mortgage (security interest), which for a time A failed to record
as required by federal law. B sold the engine to C, who searched
the record and ascertained that there was no recorded mortgage.
Thus A's mortgage was subordinate to C's interest, under § 9-
301(1)(c), which provides that an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to a buyer like C to the extent that he gives value and
receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the secur-
ity interest and before it is perfected. Thereafter the mortgage
was recorded, thus perfecting the security interest, and still later
C sold the engine to D.100
The court held that although C was protected from A's unperfected se-
curity interest,101 D was not protected because A perfected its interest by
filing prior to the sale from C to D. Arguments that since C held the
property free of A's interest D should also be protected under the shel-
ter principle were unavailing. The court pointed out that section 9-301
has no shelter principle. In response to an argument that the shelter
principle in U.C.C. section 2-403 should be applied by analogy, the court
remarked, "It is a novel theory that we believe must fail."'"
The Uniform Commercial Code often attaches a shelter rule to sec-
tions or articles that clearly provide for negotiability. In Article 3 the
shelter rule is stated in section 3-203(b). In Article 2, section 2-403 ap-
plies the negotiability principle to certain kinds of sale of goods and also
furnishes a shelter provision: "[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title
which his transferor had or had power to transfer... ."103 Similar shel-
ter rules are found in sections 7-504(1), 8-301(1), and 9-313(4)(b).1 4
There are numerous other U.C.C. sections, however, that use the negoti-
ability principle and no shelter rule is to be found. The Article 9 priority
scheme is but one instance of negotiability in the U.C.C. without an ex-
plicit shelter rule. The Permanent Editorial Board (P.E.B.) correctly dis-
agreed with the result in Aircraft Trading v. Braniff and amended
100. Permanent Editorial Board Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, Com-
mentary No. 6, § 9-301(1) (1990) [hereinafter PEB Commentary].
101. The court held that C was not a buyer in the ordinary course since the seller B was
selling its equipment, not inventory. Therefore, C was not protected by U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
Aircraft Trading, 819 F.2d at 1232-33. C was, however, a buyer protected by U.C.C. § 9-
301(1)(c) against A's unperfected interest. Id. at 1233-34, 1236. Although perfection of an
interest in aircraft requires compliance with the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1403 (1992),
the court applied Article 9's priority scheme. Aircraft Trading 819 F.2d at 1230-32. For a
discussion of security interests in aircraft, see W=m & SUMMERS, supra note 4, at § 26-17.
102. Aircraft Trading, 819 F.2d at 1234.
103. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
104. See PEB Commentary, supra note 100.
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comment 9 to section 9-301 by adding, "There is no conflict between the
principle of s. 9-301(1) and the 'shelter principle,' which is applied at
several points in the statute, but is most explicitly stated in s. 2-403(1):
'A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had.... , 05
This incident has interesting negotiability implications from two dif-
ferent perspectives. Although a "same as" position is generally touted as
the norm, the court did not reach that result in either of the transfers at
issue. Indeed, it seemed scarcely conscious of the better/same/worse al-
ternatives. A's security interest had attached to the collateral and was
effective against B. When the collateral was sold by B to C, C took free
of A's security interest and therefore took a position better than B.
When the collateral was subsequently sold by C to D, however, D took
subject to A's security interest. In the transfer from C to D the court
imposed a position on D that was worse than the status of D's transferor,
C. It reached the "worse than" result through a narrow, one might say
maniacal, reading of section 9-301(1) and apparently gave no thought to
the deeper implications of the case.
The reaction by the P.E.B. is equally intriguing. It expressed concern
about the policy implications of the court's refusal to apply the shelter
rule' 06 and argued that "[u]nderlying principles of fairness require a
broad reading and a broad application of the shelter concept, even when
not expressly stated."'0 7 However, the P.E.B. failed to acknowledge that
the negotiability principle was at work in Article 9 at an even deeper
level. If the shelter principle requires a "broad application" in Article 9
and elsewhere, it must be as a result of an equally broad application of
the negotiability principle.
The priority rules in Article 9 are arrayed along the negotiability
spectrum with rules being more or less generous to the purchaser than
the Article 3 holder in due course archetype. The priority rule in 9-
103(2)(d), 0 8 for example, is less generous than Article 3 in that it does
105. Id.
106. The primary policy mentioned by the P.E.B. is protecting the value of the property to
the transferor: "The shelter principle should be applied to protect D. Otherwise the value of
C's status, as one taking free of the security interest, is unjustifiably impaired if he cannot
confer that status on his transferee." Id.
107. Id.
108. U.C.C. § 9-103(2) is a'multistate provision that applies to goods covered by a certifi-
cate of title issued by a jurisdiction requiring notation on the certificate for perfection. If
goods are brought into a state and the state issues a certificate that neither shows the goods
are subject to a security interest nor indicates the goods may be subject to security interests,
then "the security interest is subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the
business of selling goods of that kind to the extent he gives value and receives delivery of the
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not protect a buyer who is "in the business of selling goods" of the kind
sold. Article 3 does not automatically disqualify a group of buyers from
holder in due course status. 10 9
On the other hand, Article 9 is more generous than Article 3 in its
definition of value. Article 3 has a restricted definition of value that
excludes a mere promise of performance.110 Only "to the extent the
promise has been performed""' has value been given for the purpose of
establishing holder in due course status. Article 9, however, uses the
expansive Article 1 definition of value, which includes "any considera-
tion sufficient to support a simple contract.""12 Under the priority rule
in section 9-301(1)(c), for instance, a buyer who merely promised to pay
for goods would have given value under Article 9 and could be protected
against a competing security interest. A buyer of a negotiable instru-
ment, however, who had merely promised to pay would not have given
value under Article 3 and could not be a holder in due course.1 1 3
Section 9-307(1) is both more and less generous than the holder in
due course rule. It is less generous in that a buyer in the ordinary course
of business takes free only of security interests created by his seller. In-
terests created by predecessors in title to the seller are effective against
the buyer." 4 In Article 3, on the other hand, a holder in due course
takes free of all claims including claims of predecessors in title to her
goods after issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest." U.C.C.
§ 9-103(2)(d).
109. However, § 3-302(c) does disqualify certain types of transactions from creating
holder in due course rights:
[A] person does not acquire rights of a holder in due course of an instrument taken (i)
by legal process or by purchase in an execution, bankruptcy, or creditor's sale or similar
proceeding, (ii) by purchase as part of a bulk transaction not in ordinary course of
business of the transferor, or (iii) as the successor in interest to an estate or other
organization.
110. U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(1).
111. Id
112. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(d).
113. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302 cmt. 6, 3-303 cmt. 2.
114. Massachusetts has a nonuniform 9-307(1) that gives expanded protection to con-
sumer buyers:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of section 1-201) other than a
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations (a) takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is per-
fected and even though the buyer knows of its existence; and (b) takes free of a security
interest created by a predecessor in interest of his seller if the buyer buys without knowl-
edge of the security interest and for his own persona4 family or household purposes.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 9-307(1) (West 1992) (emphasis added).
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transferor.115 But section 9-307(1) is more generous in the sense that a
buyer is protected even though he knows of the existence of the security
interest.116 A purchaser of a negotiable instrument who takes with no-
tice of a claim cannot be a holder in due course.1 1 7
Negotiability plays a role in Article 9 beyond the priority rules.
Three sections authorize or contemplate transfer of a better interest by
contract.118 Section 9-206 is already part of the negotiability litera-
ture.1 9 Section 9-316 allows a party with priority to relinquish her posi-
tion in a subordination agreement. 2 And section 9-306(2), after stating
the general rule that a security interest continues in collateral upon dis-
position, creates an exception, "unless the disposition was authorized by
the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise .... ,,2  Secur-
ity agreements taking an interest in the debtor's inventory, for example,
invariably authorize ordinary course sales. By contract, then, the debtor
is empowered to transfer an interest in collateral better than his own.
The default rules in Article 9 allow a secured party to take possession
of collateral and either dispose of it, applying the proceeds to the
debt,"z or alternatively, propose to keep the collateral in satisfaction of
the debt.1 3 If the collateral is sold, a negotiability rule delivers to a pur-
115. U.C.C. § 3-306.
116. U.C.C. § 9-307(1). A buyer in the ordinary course is protected against both un-
perfected and perfected interests created by her seller even though she knows of the interest.
The policy behind this rule is that normally ordinary course sales from inventory are author-
ized by the secured party and the buyer takes free of the interest under § 9-306(2). Section 9-
307(1) is implicated only if the sale is not authorized. In the typical transaction, then, a buyer
with knowledge of the security interest is entitled to assume the transaction is authorized. It is
only when the buyer takes with knowledge that the sale violates the security interest that she is
not entitled to ordinary course status. See § 1-201(9). For other Article 9 rules that establish
priority over a competing interest despite knowledge of the interest, see §§ 9-308(2), 9-312(2)-
(5), 9-312 cmt. 3, cmt. 5.
117. U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2)(v).
118. U.C.C. §§ 9-206, 9-306(2), 9-316.
119. See supra note 73.
120. For example, in Woco v. Benjamin Franklin Corp., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1015 (D.N.H. 1976), the defendant held a mortgage and perfected Article 9 security interest in
debtor's real estate, fixtures, and equipment. The plaintiff held a competing perfected security
interest in some of the debtor's equipment but would have lost in a priority dispute with the
defendant, except for a letter sent by the defendant to the debtor. The court construed the
letter as a statement of subordination and granted judgment for the plaintiff. Id. at 1026. In
other words, the subordination letter granted the debtor the right to transfer an interest in the
equipment superior to its own.
121. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
122. U.C.C. § 9-504.
123. The requirements for the secured party keeping the collateral in satisfaction of the
obligation (commonly called "strict foreclosure") are specified in U.C.C. § 9-505.
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chaser for value the debtor's rights in the collateral and discharges the
seller's security interest and subordinate security interests and liens. 12
Furthermore, since section 9-504 contemplates not only sales of collat-
eral, but also leases and "other dispositions," buyers, lessees, and other
transferees are protected by the negotiability rule.25 Even if the se-
cured party has failed to comply with the default requirements of Article
9, the purchaser is protected as long as he satisfies standards that are
substantially less rigorous than the requirements for holder in due course
status.
26
If the secured party opts to keep the collateral in satisfaction of the
obligation, other secured parties claiming an interest lose their rights
against the collateral if they fail to object.127 At the end of the process, a
secured party complying with Article 9's strict foreclosure requirements
acquires an interest in collateral better than her transferor, the debtor.
Ironically, because of its importance to Article 9's priority scheme,
the negotiability principle plays a more significant role in Article 9 than
in Article 3. In Article 3, holder in due course status is only material
when claims or defenses are at issue, and that is in relatively few cases.
The vast majority of negotiable instruments are transferred, presented,
and paid without difficulty.'2 8 In every Article 9 transaction, on the
other hand, the secured party must consider the possibility that the
debtor might become insolvent or that collateral might be sold, used as
collateral for a second loan, or become subject to statutory or judicial
liens.' 2 9 A secured party must be constantly aware of the negotiability
124. U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
125. See 9 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-504:11
(1990).
126. ld. In a private sale the purchaser need only satisfy the requirements of purchasing
for value and in good faith. It is also worth noting that Article 9 uses the U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
definition of good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," while the
Article 3 definition of good faith adds an objective component: "'Good faith' means honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 3-
103(a)(4). But see Neil 0. Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of
the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966), for skepticism about the difference between
subjective and objective good faith standards.
127. U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
128. A comment to U.C.C. Article 4 gives some indication of the scale of use of negotia-
ble instruments: "By the time of the 1990 revision of Article 4 annual volume was estimated
by the American Bankers Association to be about 50 billion checks." U.C.C. § 4-101 cmt. 2.
Most of these Article 4 checks would also be Article 3 negotiable instruments.
129. A secured party with a perfected interest takes priority over a U.C.C. § 9-301(3)
"lien creditor" but may be subordinate to the type of lien creditor discussed in § 9-310:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or materials
with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods in the possession
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risk and do whatever she can to insure the debtor will be unable to trans-
fer an interest better than his own.
B. Negotiability and Sale of Goods
In sale of goods under U.C.C. Article 2, the negotiabilityprinciple,
although not foundational as in Article 9, is still important and generally
unrecognized in the literature. 30 For obvibus reasons, U.C.C. section 2-
403 has elicited negotiability discussion.' 3' There are two different rules
at work in the section. The "voidable title" rule empowers a buyer who
has taken a title voidable by the seller due to some defect in the transac-
tion to "transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value."'132
Since one of the enumerated voidable title cases involves delivering
goods in exchange for a check that is later dishonored,133 the rule has
potential application in an enormous number of cases. In addition, the
rule protects "purchasers,' 34 not just buyers, and as a consequence se-
cured parties are protected by the rule.
In First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc. ,'136 four
academic institutions delivered bound volumes of periodicals to the de-
fendant Archives in exchange for the defendant's promise to deliver mi-
crofilm copies of the volumes delivered and of other periodicals. The
volumes were delivered to Archives between March and July 1970 but
only some of the microfilm copies were received by the institutions
before the defendant was placed in receivership. The court character-
ized the agreements as a sale of the bound volumes under U.C.C. Article
2.137 Plaintiff First-Citizens held a security interest against Archives's
"equipment, fixtures and furniture, all present and future inventory,
of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes prior-
ity over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute ex-
pressly provides otherwise.
130. The historical importance of sale of goods in the development of negotiability is dis-
cussed infra note 370 and notes 377-80 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 72.
132. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Transactions in which goods are not sold but rather leased are
covered by U.C.C. Article 2A, which is largely parallel to Article 2 on negotiability issues. For
the rule applicable to a "lessor with voidable title" see U.C.C. § 2A-304(1). Although Article
2 is currently being rewritten, it does not appear the amendments will have any substantial
impact on sale of goods negotiability issues.
133. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(b).
134. See supra note 58.
135. Se4 e.g., In re Samuels & Co. Inc., 526 F2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 834 (1976).
136. 179 S.E.2d 850 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 181 S.E.2d 601 (N.C. 1971).
137. Id at 852-53.
1995]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
products of debtor, present accounts receivable and all future accounts
receivable."' 38 The court held that First-Citizens' security interest at-
tached to the bound volumes as after acquired inventory,139 the interest
was perfected by a filing on June 11, 1968,'14 and the institutions had no
right to recover the volumes. Arguments that Archives held voidable
title due to its misrepresentation of solvency were brushed aside be-
cause, in the court's view, First-Citizens was a section 2-403 good faith
purchaser for value' 41 and "one with voidable title can transfer better
title than he had."' 42
The court in First-Citizens v. Archives used the negotiability principle
at two different junctures. When the bound volumes were delivered to
Archives the security agreement between First-Citizens and Archives
operated to simultaneously transfer an interest in the volumes to First-
Citizens that was better than Archives' interest. And as microfilm copies
were produced, they would also be subject to the security agreement
while in Archives' possession. 43 The educational institutions attempted
unsuccessfully to reclaim the microfilm copies held by the receiver.'"
But with respect to the microfilm copies that had been delivered to the
educational institutions prior to the appointment of the receiver, the re-
sult would be different. As to those microfilm copies, the negotiability
principle was at work and they were no longer subject to First-Citizens'
security interest.145
138. Id at 851.
139. Id. at 853-54.
140. Id at 851, 853.
141. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). The case illustrates how Article 2 grants extremely limited recla-
mation rights. The educational institutions attempted to recover the bound volumes by using
a seller's right under § 2-702(2) to reclaim goods upon discovery of the buyer's insolvency.
The court ruled against the institutions, citing § 2-702(3): "The seller's right to reclaim under
subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith pur-
chaser under this Article (Section 2-403)." First Citizens, 179 S.E.2d at 853. Alternatively, the
institutions argued that they were Article 2 buyers of the microfilm copies and entitled to
recover the microfilms still held by Archives under § 2-502(1). The court held § 2-502(1) inap-
plicable since the section requires that the seller become insolvent "within ten days after re-
ceipt of the first installment on their price" and Archives was already insolvent at the time the
bound volumes were delivered. Id. at 854.
142. First-Citizens, 179 S.E.2d at 853.
143. The microfilm copies would be part of the debtor's inventory.
144. See supra note 141.
145. There is no indication in the opinion that First-Citizens attempted to recover the
microfilm copies delivered to the educational institutions. Had it raised the issue, however,
the court almost certainly would have applied the buyer in the ordinary course priority rule
found in U.C.C. § 9-307(1) to protect the institutions.
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In contract law generally, a duress rule similar to the U.C.C. section
2-403 "voidable title" rule applies the negotiability principle to sales of
all types of property, including goods. If the seller of property is sub-
jected to duress in the bargaining process, the buyer's title to the prop-
erty is defective. The blueprint for analyzing this issue under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts'46 replicates Article 3. Does the du-
ress make the contract voidable'4 7 or is it of such severity that the con-
tract is entirely void?148 If the buyer holds a voidable title, the seller can
recover the property from the buyer but not from a subsequent good
faith purchaser. However, if the buyer's title is void, a subsequent pur-
chaser takes a title that is also void.149 This scheme is identical to the
Article 3 distinction between duress that creates a mere personal defense
and duress that creates a real defense. 50 Even a holder in due course
takes subject to a defense that the instrument was "signed at the point of
a gun .... ", ' In duress cases, then, the distinction between negotiable
instruments and other types of property is relatively unimportant.
Negotiability appears again in U.C.C. section 2-403 in the entrust-
ment rule.'5 2 A person entrusting goods to a "merchant who deals in
goods of that kind"' 53 gives him the power to transfer her title to a buyer
in the ordinary course of business. For example, in Heiselman v. Mar-
cus;5 4 the defendant agreed to purchase a new boat from a boat dealer
and traded in his old boat in partial payment. The plaintiff agreed to buy
the trade-in from the dealer. When the dealer was unable to deliver the
new boat to the defendant, the defendant took possession of the trade-in
despite the sale to the plaintiff. The court held that the defendant had
entrusted the trade-in to the dealer and that the buyer was protected
because he qualified as a section 2-403(2) buyer in the ordinary
course.
155
146. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-176 (1981). The misrepresentation
rule in Restatement (Second) makes a similar distinction between void and voidable obliga-
tions. See id. § 163 cmt. c.
147. Id. § 175.
148. Id § 174.
149. Id cmt. b.
150. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1)(ii).
151. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1.
152. U.C.C. § 2-403(2), (3). A "lessee in the ordinary course of business" is given similar
protection in U.C.C. § 2A-304(2).
153. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
154. 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
155. Idt at 397.
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The section 2-403 entrustment rule is narrower than the voidable title
rule since it protects only buyers and not other purchasers. In compari-
son with the Article 3 holder in due course rule, however, the entrust-
ment rule is both more and less generous. It is less generous in that the
seller must be a merchant who deals in goods of the kind sold.156 Fur-
thermore a buyer in ordinary course does not necessarily receive a clear
title under the entrustment rule. The buyer merely receives the en-
truster's rights to the goods with any and all defects. 57 If the entruster is
a thief, for example, the buyer in ordinary course receives no title at all.
A holder in due course, on the other hand, takes free of all claims to the
instrument. But both the voidable title and entrustment negotiability
rules in section 2-403 are more generous than the holder in due course
rule in that they use a broader definition of value.158
An application of the negotiability concept in U.C.C. section 7-20519
parallels the entrustment rule in section 2-403, although section 7-205 is
much narrower in its scope, applying only to sales of fungible goods by a
156. The "merchant" definition in general use in Article 2 provides:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
The use of the term "merchant" in the entrustment rule is narrower. The entrustment
rule applies only when the merchant "deals in goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
It does not apply to a "knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods" case.
157. This limitation on the entrustment rule is comparable to the limitation in U.C.C. § 9-
307(1), which protects a buyer in ordinary course against security interests created by the
seller but not against security interests created by predecessors in title.
158. The voidable title rule merely requires the good faith purchaser to purchase "for
value" as defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(44). See supra text accompanying notes 110-13. The en-
trustment rule protects buyers in the ordinary course of business. The definition of buyer in
ordinary course of business explains:
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured
credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract
for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial
satisfaction of a money debt.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
"Buying" is both broader and narrower than the U.C.C. § 3-303 definition of value. While
taking an instrument in payment for an antecedent claim is value, taking goods in satisfaction
of a money debt is not "buying." On the other hand, taking an instrument for a mere promise
to perform is not value, but taking goods on credit, secured or unsecured, is "buying."
159. U.C.C. § 7-205 provides that "[a] buyer in the ordinary course of business of fungible
goods sold and delivered by a warehouseman who is also in the business of buying and selling
such goods takes free of any claim under a warehouse receipt even though it has been duly
negotiated."
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warehouseman who is also in the business of buying and selling goods of
the type sold. Despite its limited range, section 7-205 demonstrates that
the negotiability principle is a flexible tool adaptable to many kinds of
problems. In addition to the general policy of encouraging ordinary
course sales, in the case of fungible goods, difficult issues of tracing and
recovery make any attempt to match claims to specific goods a mere
"theoretical right."'160 Section 7-205 wisely abandons any such attempt,
at least as to buyers in the ordinary course, by adopting the negotiability
principle.
All four U.C.C. rules1 61 protecting buyers or lessees in the ordinary
course of business employ the negotiability principle to encourage ordi-
nary course transactions in goods. Not only are all retail sales and retail
leases covered by these rules, but also sales and leases by manufacturers
and wholesalers. 62 Whenever the seller or lessor is in the business of
selling or leasing goods of the kind, a buyer, even a wholesale buyer, can
qualify for ordinary course status. 63 These rules are of more than mere
theoretical interest-in 1992 the goods component of the Gross Domes-
tic Product equaled $2,264.7 billion.164
While U.C.C. section 2-403 has generated significant discussion in the
negotiability literature, the preceding section 2-402, which also employs
the negotiability principle, has been ignored. Unsecured creditors, un-
like Article 9 secured creditors, have no contractual claim against any
particular property of the debtor. There are mechanisms, however, by
which an unsecured creditor can stake a claim to particular assets. An
unsecured creditor who obtains judgment against the debtor and levies
against her property will at some point acquire lien creditor rights. Al-
ternatively, if the debtor becomes bankrupt, the bankruptcy trustee rep-
resenting unsecured creditors gathers assets that become "property of
the estate.' 6 5 All of these potential lien creditor or bankruptcy rights
against particular goods in the debtor's hands vanish once the goods
have been transferred to a good faith buyer for value.
U.C.C. section 2-402 addresses cases in which there is a contract to
sell but the goods remain in the seller's possession. Other provisions in
160. Id. cmt.
161. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 2A-304(2), 7-205, 9-307(1).
162. See, e.g., In re Bearhouse, Inc., 84 B.R. 552 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988); Locke v. Arabi
Grain & Elevator Co., Inc., 399 S.E.2d 705 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) cert. denied (Ga. 1991); Cessna
Fin. Corp. v. Skyways Enter., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1979).
163. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 2A-103(1)(a)-(o).
164. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSaRAcT oF =H U.S. 443 (1993).
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1992).
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Article 2 allow a buyer to claim possession of goods held by the seller "if
the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first in-
stallment on their price"166 or in circumstances where specific perform-
ance or replevin are appropriate remedies.167 Section 2-402 resolves any
potential priority dispute between unsecured creditors and a buyer
claiming section 2-502 or 2-716 rights by adopting the negotiability prin-
ciple. A buyer fulfilling the requirements of section 2-502 or section 2-
716 takes the goods free of any rights of the seller's unsecured creditors.
To promote a buyer's "special property"'16 and a buyer's rights to spe-
cific performance or replevin, the seller is able to transfer an interest
better than her own.
In U.C.C. section 2-702, negotiability is neither a violation of some
fundamental principle nor an exception to a general rule; in fact, in any
choice between a seller of goods and a good faith purchaser from the
buyer, the negotiability principle is inescapable. U.C.C. section 2-702
grants a seller of goods a right of reclamation if the seller "discovers that
the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent ... "169 These
rights, however, are "subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course
or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2 -40 3 ). ' '170 If
reclamation is denied, as in First-Citizens v. Archives,17 1 the negotiability
principle transfers an interest to the good faith purchaser that is better
than the interest of the buyer. But if reclamation is granted, negotiabil-
ity is also at work. The reclamation order transfers the goods from the
buyer to the seller and the seller takes free of any claims effective against
the goods in the buyer's hands.172 Negotiability is vital, not only in sec-
tion 2-702, but whenever a transferor is granted rights to recover prop-
erty free and clear of claims against that property in the hands of the
transferee. Indeed, because those rights can be defeated by a third party
166. U.C.C. § 2-502.
167. U.C.C. § 2-716.
168. U.C.C. § 2-502 requires that the buyer have an interest that qualifies as a § 2-501
"special property" and that the buyer tender any unpaid portion of the purchase price.
169. U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
170. U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
171. See supra note 141.
172. For example, in In re Daylin, Inc., 596 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1979), the court permitted
Ray-O-Vac to reclaim goods delivered on credit to Daylin, Inc. Daylin filed for Bankruptcy
on February 26, 1975, and on February 27, 1975 Ray-O-Vac made a U.C.C. § 2-702 written
demand. IdL at 854. The court held that since a bankruptcy trustee does not qualify as a § 2-
702(3) "buyer in the ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article," Ray-
O-Vac could reclaim the goods free and clear of the trustee's interest. Id. at 856.
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with rights derived from or a claim against the transferee, negotiability is
a logical necessity.
The Article 2 provisions on money damages allow an aggrieved seller
to resell the goods and recover from the buyer the difference between
the resale price and the contract price,173 and a comparable rule allows a
buyer in possession of nonconforming goods who rejects or revokes ac-
ceptance to sell goods in her possession.1 74 In either case, the "pur-
chaser who buys in good faith at a resale" is protected from claims by the
original seller or buyer, even when the resale fails to comply with Article
2's requirements. 75 This double layer of protection implements a policy
of encouraging resale at the highest possible price and, in theory, bene-
fits both buyer and seller.176 The negotiability principle of Article 2's
resale provision is a counterpart of the section 9-504(4) rule facilitating
disposition of collateral by the secured party.1 77 This type of application
of the negotiability principle appears throughout the U.C.C. in a menag-
erie of transactions: a merchant lessee's disposition of rightfully rejected
goods,'78 a lessor's disposition of goods after breach by the lessee,1 79 a
bulk sale by auction, 80 a bulk sale conducted by a liquidator on the
seller's behalf,' 8 ' a sale to enforce a warehouseman's lien,' 82 and a sale
to enforce a carrier's lien. 83 Beyond the Uniform Commercial Code,
the negotiability principle is in widespread use whenever property sub-
ject to a dispute or claim is transferred to a third party.'4
173. U.C.C. § 2-706(1).
174. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
175. U.C.C. § 2-706(5). Although this subsection only explicitly addresses the case of an
aggrieved seller ("A purchaser who buys in good faith at a resale takes the goods free of any
rights of the original buyer even though the seller fails to comply.. ."), the issues in the case
of an aggrieved buyer are similar and the subsection should be applied mutatis mutandis.
176. Section 2-706(5) protects both against claims by the original seller or buyer and
against defects in the resale.
177. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
178. U.C.C. § 2A-511(4).
179. U.C.C. § 2A-527(4).
180. U.C.C. § 6-108(4).
181. 1&
182. U.C.C. § 7-210(5).
183. U.C.C. § 7-308(4).
184. For instance, a Massachusetts statute provides that unclaimed property is deemed
abandoned after a period of time. If the rental for a safe deposit box is unpaid for one year,
for example, the contents are to be removed by the bank, held for seven years, and, if un-
claimed, turned over to the state. Title to the property vests in the state and if it is sold the
purchaser obtains absolute title. The original owner may have a claim against the proceeds,
which are placed in an abandoned property fund, but has no claim against the property itself.
The Massachusetts statute also applies to unclaimed bequests; unclaimed property on deposit;
unclaimed property deposited as security; unclaimed dividends, stocks, bonds, drafts, insur-
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In addition to U.C.C. Article 2, both Article 6 and Article 7 employ
the negotiability principle in sale of goods transactions. The entire his-
tory of bulk sale legislation has been a response by state legislatures to
courts applying the negotiability principle to the sale of a business and its
inventory.185 A prefatory note to the recent Repealer and Revision of
U.C.C. Article 6 explains how such sales have the potential to lead to
fraud: "a merchant would acquire his stock in trade on credit, then sell
his entire inventory ('in bulk') and abscond with the proceeds, leaving
creditors unpaid. The creditors had a right to sue the merchant on un-
paid debts, but that right often was of little personal value."' 86 The in-
ventory itself was no longer subject to the claims of the seller's creditors
since the claims were unsecured and the buyer, unless he had acted
fraudulently, was protected as a bona fide purchaser. 8 7 In the sale of
the business, then, the buyer received an interest in the inventory that
was better than the seller's interest because the inventory was no longer
subject to claims by the seller's creditors.
U.C.C. Article 6 imposes an obligation on a buyer in a bulk sale' 8 8 to
obtain a list of the seller's creditors and notify listed creditors of the
impending sale.' 89 In some states the buyer must also insure that the
proceeds of the sale are paid to creditors. 90 Compliance with Article 6
ance proceeds, money paid into court, and property distributable upon dissolution or liquida-
tion; and unused traveler's checks, gift certificates, and other claims for money and credits.
See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 158, § 17; ch. 200A § 1-17 (1992).
185. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Ameri-
can Law Institute have withdrawn their support of U.C.C. Article 6. For states choosing not
to repeal, an amended version of Article 6 is recommended. See U.C.C. Repealer of Article 6
Bulk Transfers and [Revised] Article 6 Bulk Sales, Prefatory Note (1990). For discussions of
the history of bulk sales legislation, see Don L. Baker, Bulk Transfers Act-Patch, Bury, or
Renovate?, 38 Bus. LAW. 1771, 1772-76 (1983); Thomas Clifford Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A
Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. PA. L. Rnv. 72 (1928); Benjamin Weintraub & Harris
Levin, Bulk Sales Law and Adequate Protection of Creditors, 65 HARv. L. REv. 418, 419
(1952).
186. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Repealer of Article 6 Bulk Transfers and [Revised]
Article 6 Bulk Sales, Prefatory Note (1990).
187. See Billig, supra note 185, at 78-80.
188. A bulk sale is defined in U.C.C. § 6-102(1)(c). In essence a bulk sale is a "sale or
series of sales not in the ordinary course of the seller's business of more than half of the
seller's inventory . . . ." Id If the sale were in the ordinary course of the seller's business,
Article 6 would not apply and the buyer would be protected by negotiability rules in U.C.C.
§§ 2-403(2), 7-205, 9-307(1).
189. See U.C.C. §8 6-104(1)(b), (d), 6-105.
190. U.C.C. § 6-106 (1987). Revised Article 6 merely requires the buyer to "distribute the
net contract price in accordance with the undertakings of the buyer in the schedule of distribu-
tion." U.C.C. § 6-104(1)(e) (1990). As of January 1, 1995 five states had adopted the 1988
Revisions to U.C.C. Article 6 and twenty-seven states had repealed Article 6.
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allows the buyer to take the inventory free of the claims of the seller's
creditors. In other words, Article 6 creates a complex system of negotia-
bility by verified list, filing, distribution schedule, and notice to creditors.
The sanctions for noncompliance have changed substantially in re-
vised Article 6. Under the previous version, noncompliance resulted in
the buyer taking the business subject to all claims effective against the
seller; or to use the description in the official rationale for revision of
Article 6, "[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of the Article renders
the transfer ineffective."' 191 The expression "renders the transfer ineffec-
tive" is an odd description for a result that actually is a mere application
of the "same as" principle. If a bulk transfer buyer failed to comply,
under the prior Article 6 he succeeded to the right, title, and interest of
the seller. Subsequent purchasers from the noncomplying buyer, how-
ever, who purchased for value, in good faith, and without notice of the
noncompliance were protected by the negotiability principle.192
Under revised Article 6, noncompliance "neither renders the sale in-
effective nor otherwise affects the buyer's rights in or title to the as-
sets,"'193 but instead makes the buyer liable in damages to the seller's
creditors. 94 The total elimination of in rem rights is additional evidence
that Article 6 was more trouble than it was worth. Furthermore, under
the revisions, a buyer who made a good faith and reasonable effort to
comply or exclude the sale from Article 6 or held a good faith and rea-
sonable belief the Article did not apply is not liable for
noncompliance. 95
U.C.C. Article 7 creates a distinction between negotiable and non-
negotiable documents of title 9 6 that is related to the negotiable/non-ne-
gotiable dichotomy in Article 3. Unlike Article 3, however, the formal
requirements in Article 7 are minimal: "A warehouse receipt, bill of
lading or other document of title is negotiable (a) if by its terms the
goods are to be delivered to bearer or to the order of a named person
191. U.C.C. § 6-101 cmt. 1 (1990).
192. U.C.C. § 6-110 (1987). This rule is similar to rules in Articles 3 and 4 that impose an
9bligation on the first transferee but protect subsequent transferees. See infra notes 242-60
and accompanying text.
193. U.C.C. § 6-107 cmt. 2 (1990).
194. U.C.C. § 6-107(1) (1990).
195. U.C.C. § 6-107(3). The comment explains: "When a buyer makes a good faith effort
to comply with this Article or to exclude the transaction from its coverage, the injury caused
by noncompliance is likely to be de mininis .... The good-faith-belief defense is an acknowl-
edgement that reasonable people may disagree over whether a given transaction is or is not a
bulk sale ... ." U.C.C. § 6-107 cmt. 7 (emphasis added).
196. U.C.C. § 7-104.
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.... "197 "Documents of title" are produced when goods are either
shipped' 98 or stored' 99 and a document is "issued by or addressed to a
bailee and purport[s] to cover goods in the bailee's possession .... ,200
Transactions in documents ultimately are transactions in goods and to
the extent Article 7 implements the negotiability principle, goods also
become negotiable. For instance, in R.E. Huntley Cotton Co. v. Fields,20 '
the plaintiffs stored 1640 bales of cotton with Panhandle Warehouse.
The plaintiffs sold the warehouse receipts to Nowlin, who paid with
checks later dishonored. In the meantime, Nowlin had sold the ware-
house receipts to the defendants. The plaintiffs sought the return of the
warehouse receipts and the trial court enjoined the defendants from re-
moving the cotton from the warehouse. The appellate court in dissolving
the injunction held that the warehouse receipts were negotiable under
U.C.C. section 7-104202 and had been duly negotiated to the defendants.
Many of the issues associated with documents of title are akin to
commercial paper questions. A negotiable document may be "duly ne-
gotiated. 20 3 A holder by due negotiation enjoys rights similar to holder
in due course rights.2" Article 7 provides a shelter rule.20 5 Certain
claims against goods covered by a negotiable document of title are effec-
tive even against a holder by due negotiation-an echo of the real de-
fenses in Article 3.206 Article 7 grants transferees a right to compel
indorsement, °7 creates warranties upon transfer,20 8 and furnishes a
mechanism for bringing suit on a lost or missing document.2 9 It is al-
197. Id. See also Hodges v. Anderson, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1280 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1981), affd sub nom., Hodges v. First National Bank of S.C., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1289 (4th Cir. 1982).
198. Examples of shipment documents include bills of lading, airway bills, air consign-
ment notes, and destination bills.
199. Examples of storage documents include warehouse receipts, dock receipts, and dock
warrants. Delivery orders may be either storage or shipment documents. See generally RAY
D. HENSON, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 9-20 (2d ed.
1990); ROBERT A. RIEGERT & ROBERT BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 19-29 (3d ed.
1978).
200. U.C.C. § 1-201(15).
201. 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv (Callaghan) 1157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
202. Id. at 1160.
203. U.C.C. § 7-501(4).
204. U.C.C. § 7-502.
205. U.C.C. § 7-504(1).
206. See U.C.C. §§ 7-209(1), 7-307(1), 7-503(1).
207. U.C.C. § 7-506.
208. U.C.C. § 7-507.
209. U.C.C. § 7-601.
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most as if the Article 7 drafting committee used Article 3 as a template
in drawing these sections.
Furthermore, U.C.C. Article 7 is drafted in a cursory manner and
seems to rely on Article 3 to fill in the gaps. Article 7, for example, uses
the terms "indorsement in blank," "to bearer," and "special indorsee"
but provides no definitions and minimal illustrations of how these princi-
ples work in practice.210 One commercial law treatise remarks that "eve-
ryone seems to understand that an order document is comparable to an
order instrument."211 Article 3, on the other hand, devotes an entire
part to negotiation, transfer, and indorsement.212 Article 7 provides no
explicit litigation entitlements to a holder of a document of title: Article
3 presumes the validity of signatures, imposes the burden of producing
evidence on the party attacking a signature, and assumes a holder is enti-
tled to payment unless the defendant establishes a defense.213 A holder
of a document of title hoping for a litigation advantage is relegated to
arguing section 3-308 by analogy and citing a feeble section in Article
1.214
Article 7 also piggybacks on Article 3 with respect to a due negotia-
tion issue. In Article 3 a purchaser of a negotiable instrument who takes
with notice of overdueness is disqualified from holder in due course sta-
tus.215 Article 7 does not address the issue of overdueness, but presuma-
bly transfer of a stale document would raise a serious question whether
the transferee had taken by due negotiation. Article 3 and its overdue-
ness cases would provide a persuasive analogy.
C. Negotiability in UC.C. Articles 3 & 4
Negotiable instruments jurisprudence is dominated by dichotomous
thinking2 16 which undoubtedly stems, in part, from the phenomenology
of the classroom. Typically, the "same as" principle of property transfers
and contract assignments is sketched as a backdrop to Article 3 and then
the negotiability concept is introduced:
210. U.C.C. §§ 7-501(l)-(3).
211. HENSON, supra note 199, at 128-29. For discussions of Article 7's incompleteness on
the indorsement issue, see id at 127-33; RIEGERT & BRAUCHER, supra note 199, at 76-78.
212. U.C.C. §§ 3-201, 3-202, 3-203, 3-204, 3-205, 3-206, 3-207.
213. U.C.C. § 3-308.
214. U.C.C. § 1-202. See HENSON, supra note 199, at 130-31; RiEGERT & BRAUCHER,
supra note 199, at 74-76.
215. U.C.C. §§ 3-302(a)(2)(iii), 3-304.
216. See supra notes 3-15 and accompanying text.
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Whenever the word negotiable is applied to any kind of paper, the
concept always means this: if the paper is technically negotiable
(which refers to its form), it is technically negotiated (which refers
to the transfer process) and reaches the hands of a purchaser for
value who has no knowledge of problems with the transaction giv-
ing rise to the paper's creation (such a person is called a holder in
due course); then the later purchaser becomes Super-Plaintiff and
can sue the parties to the instrument who are not (with certain
exceptions) permitted to defend the lawsuit; the defendants sim-
ply lose and pay up.217
This caricature 18 is based on the assumption that commercial paper
disputes are resolvable by asking two straightforward either/or ques-
tions. Is the instrument negotiable or non-negotiable? If the instrument
is negotiable, is the holder a holder in due course? If the answer to both
questions is yes, the holder prevails. If either answer is no, the holder
takes subject to all claims and all defenses. Although some cases are as
straightforward as this simple calculus would suggest, many are not, and
negotiable instruments issues can be enormously complex, subtle, and
uncertain. Quite apart from the great variety of negotiability principles
found in Article 3,219 holder in due course status itself is more enigmatic,
flexible, and subject to qualification than the conventional explanation
suggests.
First, the real defenses put a dent in the "super plaintiff" myth. De-
fenses of infancy, "essential" fraud, discharge in insolvency proceedings,
and defenses based on obligations void through duress, incapacity, or
illegality prevail over holder in due course status. 0 The defense of for-
gery is also effective against a holder in due course, implementing a prin-
ciple even more fundamental than the distinction between real and
personal defenses: no person can be contractually liable on an instru-
ment unless the instrument bears their signature221 A defendant whose
217. DOUGLAS J. WIALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 290-91
(3d ed. 1993).
218. I suspect everyone who teaches commercial paper is more or less guilty of summariz-
ing holder in due course rights in this manner.
219. See infra notes 242-48, 261-88, and accompanying text.
220. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1).
221. U.C.C. § 3-401. See also U.C.C. § 3-403(a), cmt. 1. It is possible to be liable on a
warranty theory without signing the instrument. Under § 3-416, for example, a person who
transfers an instrument for consideration makes transfer warranties to his immediate trans-
feree and "if the transfer is by indorsement, to any subsequent transferee." U.C.C. § 3-416(a).
Transfer warranty liability between immediate parties is based on transfer rather than
indorsement.
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name has been signed without authority is not liable, even to a holder in
due course.
Discharge by material alteration also operates like a real defense,
although only in part. If A issues a $100 promissory note to B and B
fraudulently alters the amount to $500, A is discharged.t - However, if B
negotiates the note to C and C qualifies as a holder in due course, A's
discharge defense is ineffective against C, but A is liable only for the
original amount $1 00.1 C has no rights versus A to recover the $400
difference between the original amount and the altered amount. C's sole
remedy for the difference is against B on theories of indorsement con-
tract and transfer warranty.
It is in part due to the real defenses, forgery and material alteration
limitations on holder in due course rights, and the comparatively strict
requirements for holder in due course status, that holder in due course
does not occupy the extreme polar position on the negotiability spec-
trum but instead has been compromised. Other types of property such
as cash and in some cases goods, securities, documents of title, and chat-
tel paper can be more negotiable than negotiable instruments.' 4
Furthermore, although Article 3 relies principally on rules, standards
add flexibility, elasticity, and uncertainty at several key junctures. A
finding of negligence allows a court to overturn the entire Article 3 rule
apparatus, 5 and the 1990 revisions of Articles 3 and 4 introduce com-
parative negligence in four sections22 6 An obligation of good faith ap-
plies throughout Article 3 by way of a general provision in Article 1.2 7
Further, Section 1-103 provides that unless displaced, the principles of
222. U.C.C. § 3-407 (a), (b).
223. U.C.C. § 3-407(c). A defendant who has been negligent may be liable for the altered
amount. See U.C.C. § 3-406.
224. See supra notes 110-13, 116-17, 126, 156-58 and accompanying text and infra notes
248, 260, 451-58, 461-64 and accompanying text.
225. U.C.C. § 3-406(a). For similar sections see U.C.C. §§ 3-404(a), (c), 3-405(b), 4-406.
The Article 3 definition of "ordinary care" illustrates a common statutory drafting technique
of covering an area of law with a blanket standard ("'[o]rdinary care' in the case of a person
engaged in business means observance of reasonable commercial standards") supplemented
by rules applicable to particular practices ("[i]n the case of a bank that takes an instrument for
processing for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercial standards
do not require the bank to examine the instrument..."). U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7). See Kennedy,
supra note 3, at 1690.
226. U.C.C. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), 4-406. "Due care" and "reasonableness" are
paradigm standards. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1688.
227. U.C.C. § 1-203 provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement" and § 1-201(19) gives "good faith"
a subjective definition: "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
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law and equity shall supplement the Uniform Commercial Code.?
Within Article 3, explicit statements of a good faith requirementm9 cre-
ate maneuverability in thirteen sections.230 And perhaps most signifi-
cantly, a holder in due course, in addition to satisfying a list of relatively
rigid requirements such as holder status and value, must also take in
good faith.2 3 1 As a result, the central Article 3 negotiability provision is
no more certain in its application in any particular case than the good
faith standard.
Additionally, it is possible to be a holder in due course of a limited
interest. For example, a party taking an Article 9 security interest in an
instrument can also be an Article 3 holder in due course. Such a party
takes free of defenses, claims, and claims in recoupment but only to the
extent of her interest, which is not necessarily the amount of the instru-
ment. 32 Upon default by the debtor, a secured party, whether a holder
in due course or not, must proceed under Part 5 of Article 9. This pro-
cess is no less complicated than any other Article 9 default case.
On the question of remedies, the Article 3 contract rights of a disap-
pointed purchaser, whether a holder in due course or not, display the
same expectancy/reliance/restitution alternatives that fill the contract
literature. 33 Although recovery of the amount stipulated in the instru-
228. For an expansive reading of § 1-103, see Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Prin-
ciples Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 906 (1978).
229. The Article 3 definition of good faith adds an objective component to the Article 1
definition. In Article 3 "'good faith' means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4).
230. See U.C.C. §§ 3-202(b), 3-302(a), 3-403(a), 3-404(a), 3-404(b), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), 3-
407(c), 3-409(c), 3-416(b), 3-417(a), 3-418(c), 3-420(c).
231. U.C.C. § 3-302(a).
232. U.C.C. § 3-302(e), cmt. 6. See, e.g., Hollemon v. Murray, 666 P.2d 1107 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982).
233. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or
more of the following interests of a promisee:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made, or
(c) his "restitution interest" which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit
that he has conferred on the other party.
REsTATEm"NT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTS § 344.
For discussions of contract remedies see P.S. AA'rYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CoNTRAcr 1-7, 455-501, 764-79 (1979); PETER LINZER, A CoNTcrA ANTHOLOGY 210-
60, 419-452 (1989); Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest In Contract
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ment is the norm, reliance and restitution operate at the edges and work
to undermine an all or nothing view of Article 3 negotiability. In Univer-
sal Acceptance Corp. v. Burks,234 for instance, the defendant purchased
goods from District T.V. Corporation and paid by issuing a promissory
note. At the time of the transaction, the corporate charter of District
T.V. had been revoked for failure to file an annual report and pay an-
nual fees. 3 5 District T.V. negotiated the note to the plaintiff and the
defendant defaulted after making some of the payments on the note.
The plaintiff sued the defendant on the note, and the defendant raised as
a defense the revocation of District T.V.'s corporate charter. The court
held that the revocation created a defense to liability on the note and
also that the defense qualified as a real defense. The plaintiff, however,
did not walk away empty handed. The court held that although the de-
fendant was not liable on the instrument, she was liable in restitution for
the value of the goods retained by her. The court held that the goods
were worth at least the total of her payments on the note and denied her
counterclaim for return of the amount she had paid. 36
At a key juncture, Article 3 seems concerned primarily with protect-
ing the reliance interest, not the full expectancy. An executory promise
is not "value" for the purpose of establishing holder in due course status:
an instrument is taken for value only "to the extent the promise has been
performed." 237 If a purchaser of a negotiable instrument receives notice
of a claim or defense prior to performance on her promise, she cannot be
a holder in due course even though she subsequently performs. The pur-
chaser's expectation, measured at the time of contracting, is disap-
pointed. The comments to U.C.C. section 3-303 point out that a
purchaser receiving notice of a claim or defense is entitled to suspend
her own performance and raise a failure of consideration defense against
her transferor.3 8 A purchaser is protected by holder in due course sta-
tus only to the extent that she has relied by actual performance prior to
receiving notice of a claim or defense.
Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE LJ. 52 (1936), 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937); Stanley D. Henderson,
Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE LJ. 343 (1969); Edward
Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991); Steve Thel
& Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. R~v. 1045 (1992).
234. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 39 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1969).
235. Id. at 40.
236. Id. at 43.
237. U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(1). See also U.C.C. § 3-302(d).
238. U.C.C. § 3-303 cmt. 2.
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Cases of partial performance raise a particularly intriguing remedy
issue. The recent revisions to Article 3 adopt a pro rata solution.23 9 A
comment to section 3-302 illustrates the mathematics of partial
performance:
Case #5. Payee negotiates a $1,000 note to Holder who agrees to
pay $900 for it. After paying $500, Holder learns that Payee de-
frauded Maker in the transaction giving rise to the note. Under
subsection (d) Holder may assert rights as a holder in due course
to the extent of $555.55 ($500 + $900 = .555 x $1,000 = $555.55).
This formula rewards Holder with a ratable portion of the bar-
gained for profit.240
At the time Holder purchased the note he expected holder in due course
status in the full amount of the note ($1,000). When he learned of the
defense, however, he had paid only five-ninths of the agreed considera-
tion. A full expectancy position would award Holder full rights upon
payment of the $400 balance. If, as in the hypothetical, he is taking from
the wrongdoer and further payment should be discouraged, his full ex-
pectancy interest could be protected by granting him holder in due
course status as to $600-$1,000 minus $400 of costs saved. The reliance
interest would be $500. Subsection 3-302(d) creates a result that is a
compromise between full expectancy and mere reliance. In calling the
pro rata formula a "reward," the comment implies it is somewhat be-
yond Holder's entitlement and only granted out of a spirit of generosity.
The pro rata approach follows logically on the heels of the exclusion
of a purely executory promise from qualifying as value under Article 3.
If Holder had not paid any of the $900 agreed consideration, he would
not be a holder in due course in any amount ($0). If he had paid the full
$900 agreed consideration he would be a holder for value in the full
amount of the note ($1000). Only a full payment case places Holder in a
full expectation position. Partial payment cases position the purchaser
on a pro rata scale between $1000 and $0. This pro rata scale is a com-
promise between the expectation and the reliance interests.
The negotiability principle clearly plays a central role in Article 3 in
the rights of a holder in due course to take free of claims to the instru-
ment, claims in recoupment,2 1 and most defenses. Numerous other Ar-
ticle 3 provisions, however, use the negotiability principle and are
239. U.C.C. § 3-302(d).
240. U.C.C. § 3-302 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
241. U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-306.
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displayed along the spectrum from positions only marginally better than
"same as" to positions more generous than holder in due course.
A typical use of the negotiability principle imposes an obligation on
the first transferee of an instrument but allows subsequent transferees to
take free of the obligation. Negotiability is a useful mechanism for bal-
ancing the conflict between a compelling obligation on the one hand and
the free transferability of commercial paper on the other. For example,
section 3-307 creates an elaborate and detailed rule for determining
whether a person who takes from a fiduciary has notice of a breach of
fiduciary duty. The rule, however, applies exclusively to the first taker 2
from the fiduciary. Subsequent transferees, whether holders in due
course or not, are not affected by the rule and are liable only if they have
actual knowledge of the breach of fiduciary duty.
A parallel rule applies to restrictive indorsements using language "to
the effect that payment is to be made to the indorsee as agent, trustee, or
other fiduciary for the benefit of the indorser or other person. 2 43 The
comments to section 3-206 illustrate the rule:
Suppose Payee indorses a check "Pay to T in trust for B." T in-
dorses in blank and delivers it to (a) Holder for value; (b) Deposi-
tary Bank for collection; or (c) Payor Bank for payment. In each
case these takers can safely pay T so long as they have no notice
under Section 3-307 of any breach of fiduciary duty that Tmay be
committing. For example, under subsection (a) of Section 3-307
these takers have notice of a breach of trust if the check was
taken in any transaction known by the taker to be for T's personal
benefit. Subsequent transferees of the check from Holder or De-
positary Bank are not affected by the restriction unless they have
knowledge that T dealt with the check in breach of trust.2 "
If Holder took with notice of the breach of fiduciary duty under section
3-307(a), she would be subject to the fiduciary's claim. A transferee
from the Holder, however, would not be subject to the claim absent
knowledge of T's breach of trust. Sections 3-206(d) and 3-307 allow
Holder to transfer an interest better than her own and impose only mini-
mum requirements on the transferee. The negotiability principle strikes
242. The rule applies to the first party who takes the instrument from the fiduciary,
whether "for payment or collection or for value." U.C.C. § 3-307(b)(1).
243. U.C.C. § 3-206(d).
244. U.C.C. § 3-206 cmt. 4.
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a compromise between protecting the represented person245 and encour-
aging the transfer of commercial paper.
A similar rule applies to restrictive indorsements imposing a condi-
tion on the indorsee's right to payment (i.e. "Pay D if he loses 10
pounds"). Such conditions may be binding on the indorsee under con-
tract principles,246 but "[a] person paying the instrument or taking it for
value or collection may disregard the condition, and the rights and liabil-
ities of that person are not affected by whether the condition has been
fulfilled."'247 If D, then, transfers the instrument to E for value, E can
ignore any agreement between D and a prior party that payment to D
would be conditioned on D losing ten pounds.
These two restrictive indorsement rules are both more and less gen-
erous to the purchaser than the holder in due course prototype. They
are less generous in that they protect the transferee from only one claim,
failure to comply with the terms of the indorsement, not all claims. They
are more generous in that they impose fewer prerequisites than holder in
due course status. Since the only transferees not protected are transfer-
ees with knowledge "that the fiduciary dealt with the instrument or its
proceeds in breach of fiduciary duty,""24 the rules are more generous to
the purchaser than the holder in due course rule. Admittedly, the rules
speak to a narrow issue, but in cases of breach of fiduciary duty, purchas-
ers are protected by rules that fall between +8 (the holder in due course
position) and +10 on the metaphorical number line.
An analogous application of the negotiability principle protects inter-
mediary banks24 9 from claims in conversion. A representative, other
than a depositary bank, acting in good faith is not liable in conversion
unless it still has proceeds in its hands.2 0 Depositary banks must seek
refuge in the more exacting holder in due course rule or, in a case of a
fraudulent indorsement by an employee, U.C.C. section 3-405. 251 A
245. A "represented person" is a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed. See U.C.C.
§ 3-307(a)(2).
246. U.C.C. § 3-206 cmt. 2.
247. U.C.C. § 3-206(b).
248. U.C.C. § 3-206(d)(2).
249. An intermediary bank is "a bank to which an item is transferred in course of collec-
tion except the depositary or payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105(4).
250. U.C.C. § 3-420(c).
251. U.C.C. § 3-405 imposes liability on the employer in cases where the employer en-
trusts an employee with responsibility regarding an instrument, the employee or accomplice
applies a fraudulent indorsement, and the depositary bank in good faith takes the item for
collection. If the depositary bank fails to exercise ordinary care, the loss is shared between the
employer and the bank.
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transfer of an instrument from a depositary bank to an intermediary
bank is, therefore, a transfer of a "better than" position. An intermedi-
ary bank need only act in good faith to take free of a conversion claim
that is effective against its transferor, the depositary bank.
In the typical case of conversion of corporate checks, an employee
steals checks payable to his employer, forges the employer's indorse-
ment, and deposits the checks in an account especially established for
the receipt of the stolen checks. It is sensible to impose conversion lia-
bility on one of the banks handling the checks for collection, but it is not
necessary to hold all collecting banks liable. The depositary bank is in
the best position to guard against this type of fraud since it is the first
bank handling the item, and subsection 3-420(c) imposes liability on that
bank. The rule has the additional virtue of being symmetrical with war-
ranty liability.25 2 The conflict between the policy of protecting the true
owner's property interest in a negotiable instrument and the policy of
encouraging free transfer of instruments through the bank collection
process is mediated by the negotiability principle.
Most discussions of U.C.C. Article 3 sooner or later implicate Article
4. An examination of the negotiability principle is no exception. Article
4 applies to items 253 that are either deposited into or paid by the bank
deposits and collections network. 5 4 The term "item" includes all negoti-
able instruments paid or collected by a bank, but also includes non-nego-
tiable promises and orders. 5 To the extent Article 4 uses the
negotiability principle, then, it undermines a rigid distinction between
negotiable instruments and nonnegotiable choses in action. 56
252. A payor bank paying on a forged indorsement is liable to the true owner in conver-
sion since it "makes... payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to
enforce the instrument or receive payment." U.C.C. § 3-420(a). The payor bank has present-
ment warranty fights against the presenting bank and previous transferors. U.C.C. § 4-208.
The intermediary banks have transfer warranty rights against the depositary bank. U.C.C.
§ 4-207. Ultimately, the depositary bank would end up pursuing its customer.
253. U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9).
254. Id. See also U.C.C. § 4-101, cmts.
255. U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9), cmt. 8. Although typically collecting banks merely act as
agents for the owner of the item, Article 4 applies "even though action of the parties clearly
establishes that a particular bank has purchased the item and is the owner of it." U.C.C. § 4-
201(a).
256. In addition to its use of the negotiability principle, Article 4 applies other Article 3
concepts to items both negotiable and nonnegotiable. For example, § 4-207(a) creates transfer
warranties rights against all prior customers and collecting banks. Furthermore, section 4-
207(b) imposes an obligation to pay the amount of the item that is analogous to Article 3
indorsement contract liability.
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Section 4-203 provides that "only a collecting bank's transferor can
give instructions that affect the bank or constitute notice to it."'2 57 This
"chain of command" principle not only allows a collecting bank to ig-
nore instructions given by a party that is not the bank's transferor, but
also protects the bank from liability for actions in compliance with in-
structions from or agreements with its transferor.258 In the interests of
accelerating the bank collection process,2 9 a transferor to a collecting
bank transfers an item free of instructions and liabilities imposed on it by
its transferor. A treatise on Article 4 provides the following illustration:
Customer instructs Depositary Bank that a draft must be
presented within three days. Depositary Bank forwards the draft
to Presenting Bank for presentment to Buyer, the drawee. De-
positary Bank neglects to instruct Presenting Bank that present-
ment must be made within three days. As a result, Presenting
Bank is not bound by the instruction. If Presenting Bank takes
four days to present the draft, the question arises as to whether
Presenting Bank has exercised ordinary care under section 4-
202(b). If it did not, Presenting Bank is liable to Customer for
any losses caused thereby. If taking four days to present the draft
constituted the exercise of ordinary care, Customer would have
no action against Presenting Bank. However, Customer would
still have an action against Depositary Bank for its failure to in-
clude the time limit in its instruction to Presenting Bank.260
In this example, Presenting Bank takes a position that is better than the
position of Depositary Bank since it is not bound by the instruction
given to Depositary Bank by its Customer. The rule in section 4-203
applies whether the instrument is negotiable or not; all "items" collected
by collecting banks benefit from the rule. The rule is more generous
than the holder in due course archetype in that the transferee is only
bound by the instruction if it takes with actual knowledge of the instruc-
tion. In fact, this rule seems to be located at the +10 polar position on
the negotiability number line.
There are other negotiability sections in U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 that
implement an assortment of policies. The transfer26' and presentment2 62
warranties generally operate under a "same as" approach unless a party
257. U.C.C. § 4-203.
258. Id
259. Id cmt.
260. 6B WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, U.C.C. SERIES § 4-203:01 (Rev.
Art. 4) (1993).
261. U.C.C. §§ 3-416, 4-207.
262. U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-208.
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establishes holder in due course status. For example, the transfer war-
ranty that "the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim in recoup-
ment of any party which can be asserted against the warrantor 263 is
predicated on transferees receiving an interest no better than their trans-
ferors. If A issues a note to B and the note provides for a usurious inter-
est rate, A has a defense good against B.264 If B transfers the note to C
for consideration, B is liable to C for breach of transfer warranty. If C is
not a holder in due course, when C transfers the note to D for considera-
tion C also breaches the transfer warranty since A's defense is effective
against C. The warranty is breached whether C knows of the defense or
not. The "no defense or claim in recoupment" warranty is a warranty
about the state of the transferor's right, title, and interest in the
property.
Most of the other warranties also operate under this "same as" re-
gime, but one transfer warranty and one presentment warranty are dis-
connected from orthodox transfer rules.2 65 The presentment warranty
concerning an unauthorized signature of a drawer of a draft is not an
absolute warranty that the signature is authentic and authorized, but in-
stead a limited warranty that "the warrantor has no knowledge that the
signature of the drawer is unauthorized." 26  Because this particular war-
ranty is not based on right, title, or interest in the instrument but rather
on the transferor's knowledge, it is possible for a transferee to take a
position better than her transferor.26 7 If Z steals A's checkbook, forges
A's signature on a check as drawer, inserts his own name as payee, and
negotiates the check to B, when the check is ultimately paid by the payor
bank, Z is liable to the bank for breach of presentment warranty. B,
however, is not locked into a position identical to Z. When B transfers
or presents the check she would not be liable to the payor bank unless
she knew the drawer's signature was unauthorized. This "no knowl-
edge" warranty preserves the rule of Price v. Neal,268 which places the
risk of an unauthorized drawer's signatures on the drawee but creates a
good faith exception that imposes liability on a party who presents or
263. U.C.C. § 3-416(a)(4).
264. The hypothetical assumes that the defense of usury is not a real defense.
265. U.C.C. §§ 3-416(a)(5), 3-417(a)(3), 4-207(a)(5), 4-208(a)(3).
266. U.C.C. § 3-417(a)(3) (emphasis added). See also U.C.C. § 4-208(a)(3).
267. Although this discussion concerns presentment warranties, not transfer warranties,
the presentment warranties are made not only by the party presenting the instrument but also
by all prior transferors. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417(a), 4-208(a).
268. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
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transfers with knowledge of the unauthorized signature.269 A warrantor
without knowledge does not breach the warranty. A warrantor who
knows that the drawer's signature is unauthorized is liable.
The negotiability principle is also implicated when transfer warran-
ties are disclaimed.27 0 As between immediate parties, warranties can be
disclaimed either by adding specific language to the indorsement or by
separate agreement. A disclaimer on the instrument will be effective
against subsequent transferees. But in a separate agreement case, the
disclaimer is effective only against the immediate party. As a result, a
subsequent transferee will take free of the disclaimer and therefore has
rights in the instrument not available to the transferor.
The 1990 revisions of Article 3 have eliminated a negotiability provi-
sion that dealt with the issue of signatures on negotiable instruments by
authorized representatives. A classic commercial paper problem is the
agent who signs her own name to an instrument and either names the
person represented or discloses her representative capacity, but not
both. Prior to the recent amendments, negotiability was deployed to an-
swer the question whether in such a case the agent should be personally
liable.271
Between the immediate parties (in most cases the issuer and the
payee) parol evidence was admissible to prove the parties did not intend
269. If the unauthorized signature is an indorsement, rather than the drawer's signature,
the result is different since one of the presentment warranties is that the warrantor was a
person entitled to enforce. In a forged indorsement case, the loss should fall on the first
person to take from the forger, rather than on the drawee, since the drawee has no reason to
be familiar with the indorser's signature. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417(a)(1), 4-208(a)(1).
270. Subsection 3-416(c) prohibits warranty disclaimers with respect to checks, but as to
other instruments transfer warranties may be disclaimed. Hawkland and Lawrence comment:
The transferor's warranties cannot be disclaimed with respect to checks. Persons re-
ceiving checks, especially depositary banks, seldom look carefully at the back of the
check. It would be very easy for a transferee to overlook a disclaimer of the trans-
feror's warranties. Since the check collection system relies upon the transferor's war-
ranties, a transferor of a check is not allowed to disclaim any of the transferor's
warranties. Transferor's warranties on other instruments may be disclaimed either by
an agreement between the immediate parties or by including in the indorsement words
like "without warranties" or a similar phrase.
6A HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 260, § 3-416:02.
271. Prior to the 1990 revision, U.C.C. Article 3 provided:
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument.. .(b)
except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated
if the instrument names the person represented but does not show that the representa-
tive signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name the person
represented but does show that the representative signed in a representative capacity.
U.C.C. § 3-403(2)(b) (1987).
It is worth noting that as of January 1, 1995 this provision was still in force in 15 states.
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personal liability 272 If the instrument had been transferred by the payee
and was held by a nonimmediate party, however, the agent was person-
ally liable and parol evidence was not admissible to prove otherwise. In
American Exchange Bank, Collinsville, Okla. v. Cessna,27 3 for example,
the defendant signed a check with the corporate name printed in the
lower left hand comer, but the signature did not disclose his representa-
tive capacity. When the check was transferred from the payee to the
plaintiff bank, the bank received an interest superior to the payee since it
had rights not only against the corporation but also against the represen-
tative. 74 If the check were still held by the payee, parol evidence would
be admissible and the agent could escape personal liability.275 This rule
was exceptionally generous to the transferee: holder in due course status
was not required, and apparently any good faith transferee could use the
rule27 6 On the negotiability number line, this rule would be found at the
+10 polar position.
The 1990 revisions to Article 3 introduce a new concept, "claims in
recoupment, ' 277 which previously had been encompassed within the ge-
neric term "defenses" but now has been separated out for special treat-
ment. The negotiability principle is an indispensable part of this new
concept. The comments to section 3-305 provide an illustration of a
claim in recoupment:
Buyer issues a note to the order of Seller in exchange for a prom-
ise of Seller to deliver specified equipment.... [S]uppose Seller
delivered the promised equipment and it was accepted by Buyer.
The equipment, however, was defective. Buyer retained the
equipment and incurred expenses with respect to its repair. In
this case, Buyer does not have a defense under Section 3-303(b).
Seller delivered the equipment and the equipment was accepted.
Under Article 2, Buyer is obliged to pay the price of the equip-
ment which is represented by the note. But Buyer may have a
claim against Seller for breach of warranty. If Buyer has a war-
ranty claim, the claim may be asserted against Seller as a counter-
272. U.C.C. § 3-403 cmt. 3 (1987).
273. 386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Okla. 1974).
274. Id. at 496.
275. The 1990 Revisions comment on the abandonment of this particular negotiability
rule states: "If the original parties to the note did not intend that [the agent] also be liable,
imposing liability on [the agent] is a windfall to the person enforcing the note." U.C.C. § 3-
402 cmt. 2 (1990).
276. Uniform Commercial Code section 1-203 imposes a general obligation of good faith
in transactions under the Code.
277. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(3).
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claim or as a claim in recoupment to reduce the amount owing on
the note.278
As between Buyer and Seller, Buyer may use her U.C.C. Article 2
breach of warranty claim to reduce her liability on the note. Buyer could
also recover damages beyond the sum due on the note by way of a coun-
terclaim against Seller. Additionally, claims and obligations arising out
of separate transactions between Seller and Buyer could be used by
Buyer as set-offs against her liability on the note.
If Seller transfers the note, however, the transferee takes a position
that is better in two respects. First, as against a transferee from the origi-
nal payee, the claim in recoupment may be used "only to reduce the
amount owing on the instrument at the time the action is brought."279 If
the claim in recoupment is more than the sum due on the instrument,
Buyer has no rights to recover the excess from the transferee even if
payments have been made to the transferee. A worst case scenario
would have the Seller immediately transferring the note, Buyer making
payment in full to the transferee, and the Buyer then discovering a de-
fect in the goods. Buyer would have no Article 3 rights vis-a-vis the
transferee and would be forced to pursue Seller on an Article 2 breach
of warranty claim. Second, the transferee takes an interest in the instru-
ment that is not subject to set-off by unrelated claims against the Seller.
As against a transferee, the Buyer can only use claims that "arose from
the transaction that gave rise to the instrument." 0 This double negotia-
bility rule protects all transferees; holder in due course status is not
required.28'
The most significant negotiability development in the 1990 Revisions
may prove to be the abandonment in three sections of a full holder in
due course requirement.282 These sections now impose a mere "person
who, in good faith.., takes [the instrument] for value or for collection"
278. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 3.
279. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(3).
280. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 3.
281. A transferee who did not satisfy the U.C.C. § 1-203 requirement of good faith, how-
ever, should not be protected by these rules.
282. U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 3-407, 3-418. Other Article 3 sections that benefit purchasers and
require less than full holder in due course status are §§ 3-403, 3-404, 3-405. The requirements
in § 3-403, which make an unauthorized signer liable to "a person who in good faith pays the
instrument or takes it for value," are unchanged by the 1990 revisions. Sections 3-404 and 3-
405, although not requiring holder in due course status, are less generous to purchasers than
prerevision U.C.C. § 3-405 (1987), which imposed no requirements at all. Courts generally
applied § 3-405 (1987) if they found that the purchaser satisfied a general good faith standard.
See Robert G. Ballen et. al., Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, and Other
Payment Systems, 43 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1345 (1988); Robert G. Ballen et. al., Commercial Paper,
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standard and, as a consequence, are substantially more generous to pur-
chasers. They now occupy a more extreme position on the negotiability
spectrum, a position between holder in due course and +10. Further-
more, when these sections are combined with Revised Section 3-106(d),
they may have unexpected and adverse consequences for consumers in
goods or services transactions.
In 1976, a generation of U.C.C. Article 3 consumer litigation came to
a close when the Federal Trade Commission promulgated a regulation
requiring credit contracts issued in consumer goods or services transac-
tions to contain a "Notice" providing that a holder of the contract is
subject to all claims and defenses the consumer could assert against the
seller of the goods or services." 3 Courts and commentators generally
interpreted the "Notice" language as destroying the negotiability of the
instrument because payment was conditional.384 Revised Section 3-
106(d) brings these instruments back into Article 3 but provides that
there cannot be a holder in due course of such instruments. 85 The draft-
ers of this section were obviously locked into an either/or view of negoti-
ability: either the transferee is a holder in due course and takes a
position better than her transferor, or she is not a holder in due course
Bank Deposits and Collections, and Other Payment Systems, 44 Bus. LAw. 1515, 1555-56
(1989).
283. FTC Holder-In-Due-Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. 433 (1993). The full text of the
"Notice" reads as follows:
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which
the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto
or with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed
amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.
16 C.F.R. 433.2(a) (1993).
284. A negotiable instrument must be an unconditional promise or order. See U.C.C. § 3-
104(a). For commentary on the F.T.C. rule see JAmEs J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SuMMERs,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNwORM COMMERCIAL CODE app. (2d ed. 1980). See
also Daniel E. Murray, Revised Articles 3 & 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Friendly
Critique, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 337, 341 (1992). But see Michael F. Sturley, The Legal Impact
of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course Notice on a Negotiable Instrument:
How Clever are the Rascals at the FTC?, 68 N.C. L. REv. 953, 956-58 (1990). For cases holding
that the F.T.C. notice made the instrument conditional, see Capital Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lacey, 393 So. 2d 668,669 (La. 1980); Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 429 A.2d 277,281-82
(Md. App. 1981); Ford Motor Credit v. Morgan, 536 N.E.2d 587, 589 (Mass. 1989).
285. U.C.C. § 3-106(d) provides:
If a promise or order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder
contains a statement, required by applicable statutory or administrative law, to the ef-
fect that the rights of a holder or transferee are subject to claims or defenses that the
issuer could assert against the original payee, the promise or order is not thereby made
conditional for the purposes of Section 3-104(a); but if the promise or order is an in-
strument, there cannot be a holder in due course of the instrument.
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and takes a position that is the same as her transferor. The negotiability
issue is not, however, an either/or question. Instead a full spectrum of
positions are possible. Holder in due course is but one stopping point on
the line between 0 and +10.
For example, assume a consumer (C) signs a contract for the installa-
tion of aluminum siding on his home. The contractor refers him to a
finance company, which makes a purchase money loan to C, who pays
$500 down and signs a note for the $2,000 balance. The note contains
the required F.T.C. notice. C is negligent, however, in signing the note
by leaving blank spaces in the segments of the note stating the amount.
The finance company fraudulently alters the amount from $2,000 to
$22,000 by filling in the blank spaces. The note is then sold to a good
faith purchaser (P) who pays the finance company market price for a
$22,000 consumer note. The siding is never installed on C's home, and
both the finance company and contractor file for bankruptcy.
When P brings suit against C for the amount of the note ($22,000), C
will have two defenses: failure of consideration 216 and alteration.' As
to the $2,000 failure of consideration defense, C would prevail both
before and after the Revisions. The F.T.C. notice provides that P takes
subject to all claims and defenses available against the seller of the goods
or services; the failure of consideration defense is effective against the
seller. The defense therefore is also effective against P.
With respect to the alteration defense, however, the result appears to
have been changed by the Revisions. Prior to new section 3-106(d), Ar-
ticle 3 would not have applied to the note because it is conditional and P
could take no better rights in the note than the finance company. Since
C's alteration defense would have been good against the finance com-
pany, it would also have been good against P. Under the Revisions,
however, it appears that C would be liable to P for $20,000. The note is
subject to U.C.C. Article 3, C has been negligent and the negligence sub-
stantially contributed to the material alteration, and P is a person who in
good faith took the instrument for value.288 Although section 3-106(d)
disqualifies P from holder in due course status, that status is no longer
required in a section 3-406 preclusion case. It is hard to imagine that the
drafting committee intended this outcome, but when reading revised sec-
tion 3-106(d) together with 3-406, it is a result difficult to escape. Under
286. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2).
287. U.C.C. § 3-407.
288. U.C.C. § 3-406(a).
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a dichotomous approach to the negotiability principle, it is remarkably
easy for the right hand not to know what the left hand is doing.
II. TmE "WORsE THAN" ALTERNATIVE
"What! And not sell out the rest o' the property? March off
like a passel o' fools and leave eight or nine thous'n' dollars'
worth o' property layin' around jest sufferin' to be scooped in?-
and all good salable stuff too."
The duke he grumbled; said the bag of gold was enough, and
he didn't want to go no deeper-didn't want to rob a lot of or-
phans of everything they had.
"Why, how you talk!" says the king. "We shan't rob 'em of
nothing at all but jest this money. The people that buys the prop-
erty is the suff'rers; because as soon's it's found out 'at we didn't
own it-which won't be long after we've slid-the sale won't be
valid, and it'll all go back to the estate."2 9
The king's oration demonstrates a keen awareness of the "same as"
principle with its negotiability alternative and a finely tuned sensitivity to
differences in property. The gold coin could be spent "down river" and
good faith purchasers would take free of the true owner's claim.2 90 The
other property, however, would be subject to the "same as" principle.
Purchasers, even good faith purchasers, would take a "rapscallion's" ti-
tle, and that is no title at all. But when property is transferred or con-
tract rights assigned, there is a third alternative, not mentioned by the
king, and also ignored in the negotiable instruments literature: the
transferee might take a right, title, or interest that is worse than the in-
terest of her transferor. When property is transferred or contract rights
assigned, there are numerous instances in which the transferee takes
subject to a defense or claim that would be ineffective against the trans-
feror or receives an interest in property that is in some way inferior to
the interest of the transferor. There is no more profound symptom of
either/or thinking in commercial paper scholarship than this total failure
to investigate or even see this third alternative.
A "worse than" position can arise by agreement of the parties or be
imposed by a legislature or court. It is an important alternative to the
"same as" and "better than" positions and further undermines the as-
sumption that the shelter rule is dominant, natural, and fundamental. A
289. MARK TWAIN, Tm ADVENTUR-S OF HUCKLEBERRY FiNN 241-42 (Peter Coveney
ed., Penguin Books 1985)(1884).
290. See infra note 370.
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transferor is not locked into transferring an interest that is either identi-
cal to or better than her own. An entire spectrum of "worse than" posi-
tions is available by contract and is also displayed in statutes and court
opinions. Like negotiability, the "worse than" alternative is a handy tool
for implementing a variety of policies and a myriad of positions between
-10 and 0 are available.
The polar -10 position on the "worse than" spectrum is an outright
prohibition of transfer. Historically the common law was reluctant to
recognize transfer of intangible and quasi-tangible property. Assign-
ment of contract rights was particularly slow to develop and was not fully
recognized until the twentieth century.29' Merchants originally were at-
tracted to negotiable instruments not because they granted "better than"
rights, but because they could be transferred.292 As one commentator
has observed, the term negotiability has both an "original" and an "ac-
quired" meaning: "Originally it meant transferable; but afterwards it
was used to indicate the effects of transfer, namely that the transferee (1)
took free from equities, and (2) could sue in his own name."'293 In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while simple contracts were stuck
at -10 on the metaphorical number line, negotiable instruments were
struggling to stake out a position at 0.
Common law courts were reluctant to recognize the merchant prac-
tice of transferring bills of exchange and promissory notes. In a 1703
291. See, e.g., 4 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs 403-09 (1952); Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston, 30 HARV.
L. REv. 449 (1917).
292. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 47, at 275-77.
293. Ewart, supra note 69, at 140-41. See also Rogers, supra note 47, at 277. For discus-
sions of the history of negotiable instruments see PATRICK ATrYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 104-05,135-37,154 (1979); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 69, 235-36 (1973); J. MILNEs HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE IN-
sTRUmENTs IN ENGLISH LAW (1955) [hereinafter HOLDEN, HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTs]; 8 WILLIAM HOLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 113-76 (2d ed. 1937);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 177-79, 212-26
(1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 43, 81-82 (1975);
Frederick K. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law, 51
HARV. L. REv. 813 (1938) [hereinafter Beutel, Development of Negotiable Instruments]; Fred-
erick K. Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable Instruments Law of the United States, 34
ILL. L. REV. 137 (1939) [hereinafter Beutel, Colonial Sources]; Frederick K. Beutel, The De-
velopment on State Statutes of Negotiable Paper Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 836 (1940) [hereinafter Beutel, Development of State Statutes]; J. Milnes
Holden, Bills of Exchange During the Seventeenth Century, 67 LAW Q. REv. 230 (1951) [here-
inafter Holden, Bills of Exchange]; Rogers, supra note 73; Harold R. Weinberg, Commercial
Paper in Economic Theory and Legal History, 70 KY. L.J. 567 (1981-82).
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case, Buller v. Crips,294 the defendant had signed a note in the following
form: "I promise to pay John Smith, or order, the sum of one hundred
pounds, on account of wine had from him.' '295 The payee indorsed the
note to the plaintiff who brought suit directly against the maker. The
case raised no negotiability issue in the sense of the holder attempting to
assert rights that were better than the payee. The plaintiff was simply
attempting to establish that the payee had transferred his right of pay-
ment and that transfers of notes were a merchant custom as firmly estab-
lished as transfers of bills of exchange which, by 1703, had been
recognized in common law courts. The court, however, ruled against the
plaintiff, and Chief Justice Holt remarked:
I remember when actions upon inland bills of exchange did first
begin; and there they laid a particular custom between London
and Bristol; and it was an action against the acceptor; the defend-
ant's counsel would put them to prove the custom; at which Hale,
Chief Justice, who tried it, laughed, and said they had a hopeful
case of it.296
Parliament, not seeing the humor in restricting the transferability of bills
and notes, responded by passing the Statute of Anne, which made prom-
issory notes as assignable as inland bills of exchange.297
Although generally the common law and statutory law have adopted
a philosophy of free alienability of most types of property,2 98 certain
294. 87 Eng. Rep. 793 (K.B. 1703).
295. Id. at 793.
296. Id. An "inland" bill of exchange was a bill arising from trade internal to England.
An "outland" bill arose from foreign trade. See HOLDEN, IsToRY OF NEGOTABLE INSTRU-
mNmrs, supra note 293, at 47-54; HoLDswoRTH, supra note 293, at 158.
297. The statute provided in pertinent part:
All notes in writing made and signed by any person or persons, whereby such person or
persons shall promise to pay any other person, his, her, or their order, or to bearer, any
sum of money mentioned in such note ... every such note shall be assignable or indor-
sable over in the same manner as inland bills of exchange.., and any person or persons
to whom such note is indorsed or assigned ... may maintain an action for such sum of
money, either against the person or persons who signed such note, or against any of the
persons who indorsed the same, in like manner as in cases of inland bills of exchange.
3 & 4 Anne, ch. 9 (1705).
298. In his treatise Corbin offered a tentative summary of this transition in the common
law's treatment of assignments of contract rights:
A shift, from the doctrine that a "chose in action" is of such a nature that it cannot be
assigned and that an attempt to assign it as a subject of sale is illegal because involving
maintenance, to the doctrine that a provision in a contract forbidding the assignment of
rights is invalid because it involves an improper restraint on the alienation of property,
marks a great change in the climate of judicial opinion. Such a shift, however, has to
some extent occurred. It cannot be said that the new doctrine is yet established; nor
should it be predicted as yet that it will be established.
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kinds of transfers are still prohibited. For example, a federal statute not
only prohibits the transfer of fights and delegation of duties under public
contracts and orders, but in addition "any such transfer shall cause the
annulment of the contract or order transferred."2 99 Federal and state
licenses and permits are typically nontransferable or transferable only if
the transferee submits to an application process virtually identical to an
original application.300 Although contract rights are for the most part
freely assignable, an assignment is ineffective if it materially changes the
duty, burden, or risk of the obligor, or reduces the value of the return
performance, or violates public policy.30 1 Normally contract duties can
be delegated, but not if the delegation is contrary to public policy or if
the "obligee has a substantial interest in having [the obligor] perform or
control the act promised. ' 3 2 Although contract fights and duties are
generally transferable, an offer may not be assigned by the offeree.30 3
Attempts to prohibit by agreement the transfer of rights and interests
otherwise fully alienable have met with mixed success and have become
increasingly suspect.30 4 Contract terms prohibiting an assignment of
"the contract" are interpreted to exclude only delegation of duties, not
CORBIN, supra note 291, at 487.
299. 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1951).
300. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1990).
301. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNrRAcrs § 317 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-210(1). Rights
under a letter of credit can be transferred "only when the credit is expressly designated as
transferable or assignable." U.C.C. § 5-116(1).
302. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 318(2)(1981). Under the U.C.C., a dele-
gation of duties gives the other party to the contract a right to demand assurances from the
delegatee under § 2-609. Since the mere fact of delegation creates reasonable grounds for
insecurity under § 2-609, the delegatee is in a worse position than the delegator. See U.C.C.
§§ 2-210(1), (5).
303. Id. § 52. Corbin comments on this apparent anomaly:
An offer may be made by A to one specific person B; in such case B is the sole person
who can accept A's offer. The power of acceptance is not assignable by B to any third
person.... [The rule] persists ... in spite of the fact that in nearly all cases B can accept
A's offer and at once assign his contract rights and delegate the performance of his own
duties without A's assent.... In no case has B the power to rid himself of his duties by
assigning them to C, even though their performance is not personal and can be dele-
gated. This leads to the observation that when B attempts to assign his power of ac-
ceptance ... their action is usually to be interpreted as an attempt to substitute C for B
in all respects as party to the contract with A.
1 ARTHUR LiNTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs 235-38 (1963).
Rights of an offeree arising under an option contract, however, are assignable. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS § 320 (1981).
304. A contract term prohibiting transfer may assist the court in resolving borderline
cases involving rights arguably nonassignable for other reasons. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRAS § 317(2), cmts. d & f (1981).
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assignment of rights.3 °5 Several provisions of the U.C.C. invalidate non-
assignability clauses.3 06 Despite this trend, terms prohibiting the transfer
of rights under insurance policies, 3 7 agreements for the future transfer
of land,3 8 and certain kinds of personal property309 have been upheld.
In addition to contract provisions prohibiting transfer, many con-
tracts contain terms that allow transfer but place the transferee in a posi-
tion inferior to the transferor. There are myriad reasons why a
transferor might prefer to transfer an interest inferior to her own. Ab-
sent a serious conflict with free alienability principles or some other
countervailing policy, the concept of freedom of contract supports re-
strictions and limitations created by agreement. An owner of property
might convey a limited interest such as a security interest, leasehold,
mortgage, easement, mineral right, freehold estate, future interest, lien,
bailment, concurrent interest, license, or benefit of a covenant running
with land. An assignment of a contract right may be made for a limited
purpose as, for instance, an assignment for collection. Assignments may
be subject to conditions imposed by agreement (e.g., a "building contrac-
tor may assign his right to payment to a bank as security for a loan,
conditional upon the non-payment of the loan by a certain day").310 It is
also open to the transferor to assign only a part of her contract rights
against the obligor. In Restatement (Second) of Contracts, partial assign-
ments have been separated from their equitable roots and "a partial as-
signment and a total assignment are equally effective, subject to the
protection of the obligor .... ,,31 In all of these cases the shelter princi-
ple is easily overturned by agreement. These transfers would be posi-
tioned somewhere between -10 and 0 on the "worse than" scale.
Numerous statutory provisions impose a "worse than" position on
the transferee and clearly conflict with the shelter principle. The con-
305. RESTATEMENT (SEcorND) oF CoN'Rrcrs § 322(1) (1981); U.C.C. § 2-210(3). See
CoRmN, supra note 291, at 482-87.
306. U.C.C. §§ 2-210(2), 2A-303(3), 2A-303(4), 3-206(a), 9-311, 9-318(4).
307. See CoRnrN, supra note 291, at 495-96.
308. Id. at 491-92.
309. For example, in TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc., 913
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990), the nonassignability of frequent flier coupons was upheld.
310. CORBrN, supra note 291, at 509. If the transferor's own rights are conditional, the
transferee receives conditional rights by application of the shelter rule. The building contrac-
tor example, however, is different. In the example the condition is created by the assignment
agreement and the bank's rights are inferior to the building contractor's rights.
311. RESTATEMEmr (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACrs § 326 cmt. b. The obligor is entitled to
joinder of all persons entitled to the performance unless he has agreed to perform the part
separately. Id. §326(2). See also Copnxr, supra note 291, at 568-76 for a discussion of partial
assignments.
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flict, however, is seldom resolved or even mentioned in the statute. Oc-
casionally, statutory shelter rules create explicit exceptions relegating
certain types of transferees to a "worse than" position.1 U.C.C. section
8-301, for example, states a shelter rule as applied to transfers of securi-
ties: "the purchaser acquires the rights in the security which his trans-
feror had or had actual authority to convey unless the purchaser's rights
are limited by Section 8-302(4).1' 13 Subsection 8-302(4) stipulates that a
transferee who participated in fraud or illegality related to the security
or who as a prior holder had notice of a claim is prohibited from "im-
prov[ing] his position by taking from a bona fide purchaser. 314 These
provisions recognize and address the clash between the shelter principle
and policies against fraud, illegality, and status laundering.
Other U.C.C. sections, however, clash just as discordantly with the
shelter principle, and neither the section nor the shelter rule mention the
conflict. In Article 3, for example, transfer warranties run in favor of the
immediate transferee and "if the transfer is by indorsement, to any sub-
sequent transferee .... ,315 Assume A signs a promissory note in bearer
form and issues the note to B. B transfers the note for consideration and
without indorsement to C, who subsequently transfers the note for con-
sideration to D. Under section 3-416, C has transfer warranty rights
against B but apparently D does not. D's warranty rights are solely
against C. In the transfer from C to D, then, D took a position inferior
to C in that one of C's rights were not transferred to her. Could D bring
an action directly against B for breach of transfer warranty, arguing that
since C had warranty rights against B, those rights were transferred to
her under the Article 3 shelter rule?31 6 The argument is not wholly im-
plausible because Article 3 does not explicitly resolve the conflict be-
tween transfer warranties and the shelter rule.
A court could justify a decision denying D the right to sue B for
breach of transfer warranty by merely citing a rule of statutory construc-
tion, such as "expression of one thing excludes another" 317 or perhaps
the "plain meaning "318 rule. But, as Llewellyn taught us, every rule of
312. See supra notes 44-293 and accompanying text.
313. U.C.C. § 8-301(1).
314. U.C.C. § 8-302(4).
315. U.C.C. § 3-416(a).
316. U.C.C. § 3-203(b).
317. See generally 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.23 -.25 (Norman J.
Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992).
318. 1d § 46.01.
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statutory construction has a counter rule.319 If the purposes and policies
of the shelter rule were sufficiently compelling, a court could overcome
the "plain meaning" of section 3-416(a) by merely citing the counter
rule: "language may fairly comprehend... different cases where some
only are mentioned by way of example" 320 or "[plain meaning may be
avoided] when literal interpretation would . . . thwart manifest
purpose."321
A court taking a deeper look at the issue would find that the shelter
principle is completely foreign to the concept of warranty liability. War-
ranties attaching to the transfer of property typically benefit only the
immediate transferee. Warranties arose out of contract, and, contract
privity requirements inhibited development of third party rights. In
U.C.C. Article 2, the implied warranties of merchantability,322 fitness for
particular purpose,323 and implied warranties created by course of deal-
ing or usage of trade3' traditionally have conferred rights on the imme-
diate buyer and not on subsequent buyers in the distribution chain.
Only recent case law and statutory liberalization of privity restrictions
have started to erode this position. The entire question, sometimes
known as the "vertical privity" issue, is generated because the shelter
principle, far from being a fundamental concept, is unknown to warranty
liability. If the shelter principle did apply, a subsequent buyer would
receive the right, title, and interest of his seller, which would include
rights against the prior seller for breach of warranty. In fact, historically
these rights were not transferred. Courts and legislatures have been
agonizingly slow in extending liability.325
When a document of title is negotiated or transferred, warranty is-
sues are raised both about the document (Le., its genuineness, knowl-
edge of facts impairing its validity or worth, and the rightfulness and
effectiveness of the transfer) and about the goods represented by the
319. See KARL N. LL..ELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECDING APPEALS app.
C (1960).
320. Id. at 526.
321. Id. at 524. For general discussions of statutory interpretation, see GUIDo CALA-
BRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-43 (1982); JAMES WILLARD HURST,
DEALING WmI STATUTES 31-65 (1982); Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules under
Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA L. REv. 898 (1983).
322. U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
323. U.C.C. § 2-315.
324. U.C.C. § 2-314(3).
325. For discussion of vertical privity, see Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer?
Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice of Breach in Nonprivity Contexts, 66 N.C. L. REv. 107,132-36, 152-
53 (1987); Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement:
Once More into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REv. 9, 42-44, (1987).
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document. On the question of warranties about the goods, U.C.C. Arti-
cle 7 defers to other law.326 But warranties about the document are ad-
dressed in section 7-507, and those warranties expressly benefit only the
immediate purchaser and not subsequent transferees.327 When docu-
ments of title are transferred, the transferee takes a position worse than
her transferor since the right to sue a prior party in warranty is not
transferred.
In comparison, then, with warranties applied to other types of prop-
erty, warranties arising from the transfer of negotiable instruments are
relatively generous. An Article 3 purchaser has warranty rights not only
against his transferor but also against prior transferors who indorse. This
largess arises not from the negotiability concept but simply from an ap-
plication of the "same as" principle to an area of the law, warranty liabil-
ity, where it is otherwise unknown.
Statutory applications of the "worse than" concept are not limited to
warranty sections. Uniform Commercial Code sections imposing a posi-
tion on transferees that is in some sense inferior to the transferor
demonstrate the scope and variety of "worse than" provisions.
When a promissory note or uncertified check is taken for an obliga-
tion, the merger principle suspends the obligation until the instrument is
dishonored.328 Upon dishonor, the rights of the person entitled to en-
force329 depend, however, upon his status as the original obligee or a
transferee. If, after dishonor, the person entitled to enforce is the origi-
nal obligee, he may sue the obligor either on the instrument or on the
underlying obligation.330 On the other hand, if the person entitled to
enforce is not the original obligee, "the only right that survives is the
right to enforce the instrument. ' 33 1 In other words, when the payee of a
promissory note or uncertified check transfers the instrument, the trans-
feree takes fewer rights than were available to the transferor. The right
to sue on the underlying obligation is not transferable and it does not
326. While previous versions of Article 7 addressed warranties as to goods, the comments
to current § 7-507 indicate: "This section omits provisions of the prior acts on warranties as to
the goods as unnecessary and incomplete. It is unnecessary because such warranties derive
from the contract of sale and not from the transfer of the documents." U.C.C. § 7-507 cmt. 1.
327. U.C.C. § 7-507.
328. U.C.C. § 3-310(b).
329. The expression "person entitled to enforce" was introduced by the 1990 revisions
and is defined as "(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instru-
ment who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is
entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d)." U.C.C. § 3-301.
330. U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(3).
331. U.C.C. § 3-310 cmt. 3.
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remain with the obligee: it simply evaporates upon transfer of the in-
strument.332 If the instrument is reacquired by the original obligee, how-
ever, the right to sue on the obligation reappears and the obligee can sue
either on the instrument or on the underlying obligation.333
Even the most rudimentary check or note transaction, then, utilizes
both the "worse than" and "better than" principles. A signs a check as
drawer and issues it to B. B transfers the check to C, who presents it to
the payor bank and the check is dishonored. B reacquires the check
from C and demands payment from A. In this scenario, B transferred a
position to C that was worse than her own. B could have sued A either
on the instrument or on the underlying obligation, while C is restricted
to suing A on the instrument. When C retransferred the check to B,
however, B took an interest better than C since B has rights to sue either
on the instrument or on the obligation. It could be argued, of course,
that B's rights are not derived from transfer but are based on her origi-
nal rights, which are simply reacquired upon transfer. The transfer from
C to B is, however, at least a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition of
B's "better than" status. The point here is that section 3-310 violates the
allegedly fundamental shelter rule at least once and perhaps twice with-
out so much as a nod in its direction.
The 1990 Revisions create a new rule in section 3-312 that uses the
"worse than" option to address a particularly knotty commercial paper
problem; "cases in which a cashier's check, teller's check, or certified
check is lost, destroyed, or stolen.' ' 3 4 The conflict between protecting
the bank against the risk of double liability and providing some relief to
the owner of the check had not been addressed by statute prior to the
Revisions.
To illustrate the issue, consider the tale of Jesus Santos.335 In June
1978 Santos withdrew $15,514.46 from a savings account and purchased a
cashier's check in that amount payable to his order. He sent the check
to his father, and it was apparently lost in the mail. The bank refused to
issue a substitute check unless Santos provided an indemnification bond
or posted other security. Santos found this impossible because he was
332. U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(4), cmt. 3.
333. The discussion of the merger rule in comment 3 to U.C.C. § 3-310 includes the fol-
lowing remark: "Thus, if the seller sold the note or the check to a holder and has not reac-
quired it after dishonor, the only right that survives is the right to enforce the instrument."
(emphasis added).
334. U.C.C. § 3-312 cmt. 1.
335. Santos v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 451 A.2d 401 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982).
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unemployed and the cashier's check represented all of his assets.336 He
brought suit under prior U.C.C. section 3-804 requesting that the bank
be ordered to issue a substitute without security. 37 The trial court
adopted the bank's position and held that the bank was required to is-
sue a substitute only upon Santos obtaining a security bond effective un-
til June 17, 1985 (seven years after issuance of the check).338 On appeal
Santos fared somewhat better-the bank was ordered to issue a certifi-
cate of deposit in Santos' name, pay the interest from the certificate
quarterly, and pay the principal to Santos on July 1, 1984, if the check
had not surfaced by that date.339 The result hardly encourages the
purchase of cashier's, teller's, or certified checks.
Revised section 3-312 uses the "worse than" option to strike a bal-
ance between the bank and its customer. When a cashier's, teller's, or
certified check is lost, destroyed or stolen, the customer has a right to
simply file a written "declaration of lOss ' '34° with the bank and if the
check is not presented to the bank for payment within 90 days of its date,
the bank must pay the amount of the check to the customer?341 If the
customer has transferred the check to a third party, however, that person
does not have a right to file a section 3-312 "declaration of loss" and
usually will be required to provide security to the bank.342 The Official
Comment to section 3-312 discusses the refusal to grant rights under the
section to transferees:
Limitation to an original party or remitter gives the obligated
bank the ability to determine, at the time it becomes obligated on
the check, the identity of the person or persons who can assert a
claim with respect to the check. The bank is not faced with hav-
ing to determine the rights of some person who was not a party to
the check at that time or with whom the bank had not dealt?4
3
When the check is transferred from the customer to the third party, the
transferee takes a position inferior to the transferor?"nn Apparently the
336. Id. at 403.
337. In the alternative, Santos requested an account be established that would periodi-
cally pay interest to him and pay the principal after the six year limitations period. See id. at
404.
338. Id. at 403. This date was seven years after issuance of the check. The New Jersey
limitations period is only six years and it is unclear why the trial court tacked on an extra year.
339. Id. at 414.
340. U.C.C. § 3-312(a)(3).
341. U.C.C. § 3-312(b)(2).
342. See U.C.C. §8 3-312 cmt. 1, 3-309.
343. U.C.C. § 3-312 cmt. 2.
344. On the negotiability number line, the transferee takes a position that is somewhere
between -10 and 0.
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drafting committee did not feel constrained by any sense that whenever
property is transferred the transferee must inevitably receive all of the
rights of the transferor or by any feeling that a "same as" position is
fundamental and natural. Section 3-312 betrays no hint that it is depart-
ing from the shelter concept.
The U.C.C. Article 3 requirements for "holder" status are among the
most rigid rules of negotiable instruments law. A "holder" must have
possession of the instrument and the instrument must either be in bearer
form or payable to the person in possession.345 Transferring an order
instrument without indorsement, even though the transfer is completed
by delivery and otherwise fully effective, means that the transferee is not
a holder346 and further, that the delivery does not qualify as an Article 3
negotiation.347 This failure to comply with the formalities for negotia-
tion results in the transferee taking a position that is worse than the posi-
tion of her transferor in two different senses.
First, in litigation a transferee who does not qualify as a holder is not
entitled to the section 3-308(b) presumption that she is a person entitled
to enforce the instrument. 48 Instead, she must plead and prove a trans-
fer to her from the holder and then claim the protection of the shelter
rule.349 Ironically, the shelter rule is put to work in a circumstance
where realistically the transferee is not in the same position as her
transferor.
Second, if the transfer is a transfer for value, "the transferee has a
specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the
transferor, 3 50 and when the indorsement is applied, the transferee be-
comes a holder. But since a negotiation of the instrument does not occur
until indorsement,31 1 if, in the interim, the transferee receives notice of a
claim, defense, dishonor, overdueness, unauthorized signature, or altera-
tion, he cannot be a holder in due course.352
345. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) provides: "'Holder,' with respect to a negotiable instrument,
means the person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an
instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in possession."
346. Although the transferee would have possession, she would not be the person "identi-
fied" in the instrument as required by U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
347. In order for a transfer to be a negotiation, Article 3 requires that the transferee
qualify as a holder. See U.C.C. § 3-201(a).
348. See U.C.C. § 3-308 cmt. 1.
349. See i.; U.C.C. § 3-203(b), cmt. 2.
350. U.C.C. § 3-203(c).
351. Id
352. U.C.C. § 3-203 cmt. 3. See, e.g., Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Chess, 129 Cal. Rptr. 852
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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Both rules undoubtedly encourage transferees to insure the trans-
feror indorses at the time of delivery, but the rigidity of the rule also
means that a failure to observe the requirements places the transferee in
a position substantially worse than her transferor. Furthermore, the for-
malities of negotiation place negotiable instruments at a relative disad-
vantage vis-a-vis other types of property (e.g., goods, cash, contract
rights) that can be transferred by mere delivery.
The final point is that the "worse than" and "better than" spectra are
issue specific. It is entirely possible for a transferee to be in a better
position on one issue, in the same position on a second issue, and in a
worse position on a third.
For example, assume A owes a $10,000 annual rent to B for office
space. The local economy has been poor, A is unable to make the rental
payment, and B decides she will take a $9,000 one year note from A
rather than lose a tenant. B fails to make certain repairs to the premises
as required by the lease, giving A a $1,500 claim in recoupment. B in-
dorses and transfers the note to C who subsequently indorses and trans-
fers the note to D. Both C and D take the note with notice of the claim
in recoupment. As the due date approaches, it is apparent A will have
difficulty paying, and B repurchases the note from D.
When D transfers the note to B, does B take a position that is better
than, the same as, or worse than D? The correct answer is all of the
above. If the issue is A's liability on the underlying obligation to pay the
$10,000 rent, B is in a better position than D. D had no right to sue A on
the obligation because his rights would have been limited to rights on the
instrument. 3  B, the original obligee, could opt to sue A either on the
instrument for his $9,000 obligation as maker354 or on the underlying
$10,000 rental obligation. 5 If the issue is A's ability to raise his $1,500
claim in recoupment as a set off to his liability as maker of the note, B
takes a position that is the same as D's. A's claim in recoupment is effec-
tive both against B and D since neither of them qualifies as a holder in
due course.356 However, if the issue is C's liability in contract as an in-
dorser of the note, B takes a position that is worse than D's. D could
have sued C on her indorsement 3 5 7 but B, as a holder prior to C who
353. See supra notes 328-33 and accompanying text.
354. U.C.C. § 3-412.
355. U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(4).
356. U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(3).
357. U.C.C. § 3-415.
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reacquires the note, is unable to sue C.118 In the transfer from D to B, B
takes a position that is better than, the same as, and worse than D's
depending on the issue.
Il. THE NEGOTIABILITY NETWORK
[I]n the notes to Miller v. Race (1 Smith Lead. Cas. at 259), where
all the authorities are collected, the very learned author says: "It
may therefore be laid down as a safe rule that where an instru-
ment is by the custom of trade transferable, like cash, by delivery,
and is also capable of being sued upon by the person holding it
pro tempore, then it is entitled to the name of a negotiable instru-
ment, and the property in it passes to a bona fide transferee for
value, though the transfer may not have taken place in market
overt."
359
Both the standard histories of negotiable instruments and the brief
synopses typically included in general histories of the common law em-
phasize two different aspects of the story. Some stress the commercial
and economic forces (e.g., debt collection, settlement of foreign ac-
counts, lender protection, transmission of funds, demands for liquidity)
that created and nurtured promissory notes and drafts.360 Others focus
on the rise and fall of competing court systems in England. 361 My goal is
to concentrate on a third relatively neglected aspect of the story: the
extent to which courts in negotiable instrument cases borrowed concepts
from other property areas to fashion the "better than" principle. Fur-
thermore, when the negotiability principle became established for notes
and drafts, connections to other types of property tended to be ignored
and then forgotten, surfacing only in cases falling at the borders between
properties. Once amnesia had set in, the situation was ripe for "reverse
borrowing" in which the negotiability principle was borrowed back by
the originating property area. The principles of borrowing and then ig-
358. U.C.C. § 3-207. The revised section is less clear on this point than U.C.C. § 3-208
(1987), but the rule that intervening parties (C) are discharged as against prior reacquiring
parties (B) almost certainly survives the revisions. The policy of the rule is to escape an other-
wise unavoidable circularity problem (ie., if C were not discharged, B would sue C on Cs
indorsement, then C would sue B on B's indorsement, etc.).
359. Crouch v. The Credit Foncier of England, Ltd., 8 L.R. 374,381 (Q.B. 1873), quoted in
HOLDEN, IsToRY OF NEGoTIABLE RsamumENTs, supra note 293, at 4 (emphasis added).
360. See, e.g., ATiYAH, supra note 293, at 104-05, 154; FRIEDMAN, supra note 293, at 235-
38; HoRvrrz, supra note 293, at 212-26; NELSON, supra note 293, at 43; Beutel, Colonial
Sources, supra note 293, at 139-40; Holden, Bills of Exchange, supra note 293, at 234-36; Wein-
berg, supra note 293.
361. See, e.g., HOLDEN, HmsToRY OF NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS, supra note 293, at 14-20;
Beutel, Development of Negotiable Instruments, supra note 293.
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noring or forgetting are displayed in two pivotal negotiability cases:
Miller v. Race362 and Peacock v. Rhodes.363
The item of property at issue in Miller v. Race was a bank note issued
by the Bank of England. At the time, bank notes were not legal tender
but mere promises to pay.3 4 A modem equivalent would be a certifi-
cate of deposit. Finney owned the bank note and on December 11, 1756,
mailed it to Odenharty. The note was stolen in transit and on December
12 the plaintiff Miller, an inn keeper, purchased the note in good faith. 65
Finney requested and the Bank of England agreed to stop payment on
the note. 66 When Miller presented the note, the defendant Race, a
bank clerk, refused to pay and kept the note. Miller brought suit against
Race for payment. At the time, bank notes were fully transferable, but
the "better than" principle had yet to be applied to them. The facts of
Miller forced the court to confront the issue. If Miller could not take a
better right, title, and interest than his transferor, he would lose because
his transferor was either a thief or held title through a thief. In order for
Miller to prevail, the court would have to decide that a transferee of a
bank note could take a right, title, or interest better than the transferor.
The arguments of counsel and the opinion of the court invoke a daz-
zling array of analogies to other types of property: goods, money,3 67 lot-
tery tickets, bills of exchange,368 non-bank notes,369 Exchequer notes,
and land. In two of these areas, goods and money, the "better than"
principle had been firmly established, so they became fruitful sources of
analogy for the plaintiff.37
362. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
363. 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781). Both Miller v. Race and Peacock v. Rhodes are opin-
ions by the legendary commercial law judge William Murray (Lord Mansfield). For discus-
sions of Mansfield's judicial style, see LLEWELLYN, supra note 319, at 36-38; Daniel R.
Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation IV. The Nature of Civilian Influence on Mod-
em Anglo-American Commercial Law, 67 B.U. L. REv. 877, 948-70 (1987).
364. Notes of the Bank of England became legal tender in 1833. See, eg., J.S. Waterman,
The Promissory Note as a Substitute for Money, 14 MiNN. L. REv. 313, 321 (1930).
365. Apparently Miller gave cash (i.e., coins) in exchange for the bank note. Miller, 97
Eng. Rep. at 402. At the trial it was found "that he took it for a full and valuable considera-
tion in the usual course of business." Id.
366. Id at 399. The bank required Finney to post security.
367. The report of the case uses "money" and "cash" interchangeably to refer to coins.
368. Bills of exchange are also referred to as "securities" in the report.
369. Non-bank notes are also referred to as "documents for debts" in the report.
370. The negotiability principle had been applied to coin at least as early as 1599. In
Higgs v. Holiday, 78 Eng. Rep. 978 (K.B. 1599), the court denied a cause of action in trover
for recovery of coin "because it cannot be known" and "when he had lost the possession
thereof he lost the property also." See also Waterman, supra note 364, at 315.
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The goods question was raised initially by defendant's counsel Lloyd.
The plaintiff had sued in trover, a form of action used to test title to
goods. 37 1 Lloyd contended that the action here was brought "not for the
money due upon the note; but for the note itself, the paper .... ,,372 He
argued that although bank notes were accepted in the course of trade as
cash, 373 the question before the court was title to the note itself, not the
bank's obligation to pay, and "[n]ow this note, or these goods (as I may
call it) was the property of Mr. Finney who paid in the money: he is the
true owner. ' 374 Lloyd cited Armory v. Delamirie375 in support of the
proposition that a finder of property may keep it "against all but the
rightful owner."376 The thrust of his argument was that the true owner
recovers goods when they are lost or stolen and the same rule should
apply to bank notes.
Williams, counsel for the plaintiff, argued in reply that the case "falls
within the reason of a sale in market-overt; and ought to be determined
upon the same principle. '377 For at least one hundred-fifty years it had
been established that a buyer of goods in market-overt received good
A sale of goods in market overt delivered good title to the purchaser. English law flirted
with the principle for a few hundred years before it became "settled law by 1596." Holds-
worth, supra note 293, at 111. Blackstone provides the following description:
Market overt in this country is only held on the special days provided in particular
towns by charter or prescription; but in London every day, except Sunday is market
day. The market place, or spot of ground set apart by custom for the sale of particular
goods, is also in the country the only market overt; but in London every shop in which
goods are exposed publicly to sale is market overt for such things only as the owner
professes to trade in.
2 Wni.TAM BLAcIsroNE, COMMEpNTAREs *449, quoted in RAY ANDREws BROWN, THEn LAW
OF PERsONAL PROPERTY 232-33 (2d ed. 1955).
371. See F.W. MArrLANr, Tim FoRms OF ACnON AT COMMON LAw 57-58 (A.H. Chaytor
& WJ. Whittaker eds. 1968) (1909).
372. Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at 399.
373. The report of the case states:
It was admitted and agreed, that, in the common and known course of trade, bank
notes are paid by and received of the holder or possessor of them, as cash; and that in
the usual way of negotiating bank notes, they pass from one person to another as cash,
by delivery only and without any further inquiry or evidence of title, than what arises
from the possession.
Id. at 398-99.
374. Id. at 399.
375. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722). Armory v. Delamirie is a chestnut property case. A
chimney sweep's boy found jewels set in a jewelry setting. The boy took the jewelry to a
goldsmith. An apprentice removed the stones, weighed them, and offered the boy three half-
pence, which the boy declined, whereupon the apprentice returned the setting without the
stones. The court gave recovery against the goldsmith in trover.
376. Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at 400.
377. Id.
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title even if the goods had been stolen. 78 Williams agreed with Lloyd
that a finder or a thief of a note does not have a right against the true
owner, but "after circulation, the holder upon a valuable consideration
has a right '3 79 and that the case should be "considered upon the same
foot as a sale in market overt. '380 The report of Miller v. Race does not
specify the reason or "foot" of the market-overt rule, but Williams was
undoubtedly referring to the policy of encouraging ordinary course
transactions in goods381 and was attempting to establish that there was
an equally important policy in encouraging ordinary course transactions
in bank notes.
Lloyd, in reply, emphasized the general rule that when a "thing" is
stolen it may be recovered and the bank note was "a mere piece of pa-
per.'' 382 As to the market-overt exception, he argued that "there is no
market overt for bank notes"383 and that the reason behind the market-
overt rule did not apply here.
Before considering further arguments by analogy, it is worth noting
Mansfield's posture in the case. The arguments were delivered on a Fri-
day.3 4 At the conclusion, Mansfield deferred his decision until the fol-
lowing Tuesday. When court reconvened, the reporter recorded the
following preliminary remark:
Upon this argument on Friday last, Ld. Mansfield then said Sir
Richard Lloyd had argued it so ingeniously, that (though he had
no doubt about the matter,) it might be proper to look into the
cases he had cited, in order to give a proper answer to them; and
therefore the Court deferred giving their opinion, to this day. But
at the same time, Ld. Mansfield said, he would not wish to have it
understood in the city, that the court had any doubt about the
point.385
In his opinion, Mansfield, speaking for a unanimous court, ruled in favor
of the purchaser of the bank note. He opted not to employ the analogy
378. See supra note 370.
379. Miller, 97 Eng Rep. at 400.
380. Id
381. Arguably, a further policy justification for the market overt rule is that the true
owner should be estopped since she did not track down the goods. In Baynes Case, 79 Eng.
Rep. 1196, a silver basin and ewer were stolen from the Bishop of Worcester and sold in a
London scrivener's shop. The court held that the sale was not in market overt, "for a scriv-
ener's and cutler's shop, or the like, is not proper for the sale of plate, nor a place to which
men will go to seek for such a thing lost or stole." I.
382. Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at 400.
383. Id. at 401.
384. The report indicates the date was January 27, 1758.
385. Id.
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to market-overt and its underlying policy. A simpler analogy was avail-
able to him. Money provided a more direct corollary to bank notes and
was unburdened by the time and place restrictions of market-overt.
On the previous Friday, Lloyd argued that there were two distinc-
tions between the question before the court and a case involving money.
First, the plaintiff had sued in trover, which was always linked to goods,
here the paper itself, and that was a different form of action "from what
must be brought against the bank for the money. 38 6 Second, bank notes
are different from money in that notes are unique.3 87 Money, unlike
bank notes, "is not to be distinguished, but these notes or bills are distin-
guishable .... They have distinct marks and numbers on them. '388
Williams replied that as to the first point "the right to the money will
attract to it a right to the paper. 38 9 On the second point he reaffirmed
the admitted and agreed course of trade that bank notes were in fact
treated as money. Lloyd responded: "Supposing this note to be a sort of
mercantile cash; yet it has an earmark by which it may be
distinguished. 390
Mansfield began his opinion by asserting that bank notes are not like
goods or securities or documents for debts but are treated as money:
"they are as much money, as guineas .... ,,391 He then surveyed in-
stances in the law in which bank notes were treated as money: bank
386. Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at 399.
387. The bank note in Miller was in the amount of 21 pounds and 10 shillings. Id. at 398.
388. Id. at 399.
389. Id. at 400.
390. Id. The expression that something has an "ear-mark" has a peculiar history. The
words chattel and cattle have a similar root. The term "ear-mark" referred to a brand that
allowed the owner to reclaim cattle if lost or stolen:
My cattle have been driven off; I must follow the trail; it is the duty of my neighbors to
assist me, to ride with me. If we catch the marauder still driving the beasts before him,
we take him as a "hand-having" thief and he is dealt with in a summary fashion; "he
can not deny" the theft. The practice of ear-marking or branding cattle, and the legal
duty that I am under of publicly exposing to the view of my neighbors whatever cattle I
have, make it a matter of notoriety that these beasts, which this man is driving before
him, have been taken from me. Even if we can not catch a thief in the act, the trail is
treated as of great importance. It leads into a man's land, he must show that it leads
out again; otherwise it will "stand instead of a foreoath"; it is an accusing fact. If the
possessor has no unbroken trail in his favour, then, when he discovers the thing, he lays
his hand upon it and claims it. He declares the ox to be his and calls upon the possessor
to say how he came by it .... Then the pursuer with his left hand grasping one of the
beast's ears, and his right hand upon a relic or a sword, swears that the beast is his.
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MArrLAND, THE HISTORy OF ENGLISH LAW
157-58 (1911).
391. Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at 401. A guinea was an English gold coin worth 21 shillings.
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notes pass by a will bequesting "money or cash"; receipts for payment of
bank notes "are always given as for money"; and in bankruptcy proceed-
ings bank notes are treated as money.39 He commented that the real
reason money cannot be recovered is because of its currency; "in case of
money stolen, the true owner can not recover it, after it had been paid
away fairly and honestly upon a valuable and bona fide considera-
tion. '3 93 He quibbled with the rationalization that money cannot be re-
covered because it is indistinguishable and has no earmark: "It is a pity
that reporters sometimes catch at quaint expressions that may happen to
be dropped at the Bar or Bench; and mistake their meaning. '394
Mansfield's goal here is clear. Defining the "true" reason for
money's currency as commercial practice, rather than the lack of distin-
guishing features, allowed him to group bank notes with money, rather
than with goods. Once bank notes had been linked to money, the result
followed inevitably: "Apply this to the case of a bank-note. An action
may lie against the finder, it is true; (and it is not at all denied:) but not
after it has been paid away in currency. '395
Lottery tickets are a third type of property explored as an analogy in
Miller. Lloyd cited Ford v. Hopkins,396 an opinion by Sir John Holt in
which Holt had reportedly stated bank notes, Exchequer notes, and lot-
tery tickets were similar in that they had distinctive numbers and marks
unlike money, which cannot be distinguished. The plaintiff's reply in
Miller is not spelled out in the report of the case, which merely com-
ments "he answered Sir Richard Lloyd's cases. 397
Mansfield responded to Ford v. Hopkins by attacking the report of
the case:
But this must be a very incorrect report of that case: it is impossi-
ble that it can be a true representation of what Ld. Ch. J. Holt
said. It represents him as speaking of bank-notes, Exchequer-
notes, and million lottery tickets, as like to each other. Now no
two things can be more unlike to each other, than a lottery-ticket,
and a bank-note. Lottery tickets are identical and specific: spe-
cific actions lie for them. They may prove extremely unequal in
value: one may be a prize; another a blank. Land is not more
specific, than lottery-tickets are.398
392. Id.
393. Id-
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. 91 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1700).
397. Miller, 97 Eng. Rep. at 400.
398. Id- at 402.
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Mansfield employed the lottery ticket analogy to construct a dist-
inguishability scale from property with no "ear-mark" to property that
was extremely particular. By extending the scale (i.e., from money to
bank notes to goods to lottery tickets to land) it became easier for him to
group bank notes with money. A shorter scale (i.e., money to bank
notes to goods) would have made the question of linking bank notes to
money appear problematic.
Miller has several references to other types of property both in argu-
ment and in the opinion. "[A bank note] is like a medal which might
entitle a man to payment of money, or to any other advantage. 399
"[T]his note is a mere piece of paper; it may be as well stopped, as any
other sort of mercantile cash (as, for instance, a policy which has been
stolen)."4 ' "Now [bank notes] are not goods, not securities, nor docu-
ments for debts .... 1401 The array of analogies provided the court with
a wealth of options, and the analogy to money allowed Mansfield to
reach a result that implemented the commercial policies he viewed as
critical.
In addition to Mansfield's introductory remark ("he would not wish
to have it understood in the city, that the Court had any doubt about the
point"), he indicated that even at the trial he had no doubt the plaintiff
would win "upon the general course of business, and from the conse-
quences to trade and commerce which would be much incommoded by a
contrary determination. ' 40 2 As Mansfield sorted through analogies to
eight different types of property, it is clear he was guided by the com-
mercial consequences of his decision. Miller clusters money, bank notes,
and goods sold in market overt as types of property where a "better
than" position was possible, but bills of exchange and non-bank notes
were still relegated to the "same as" rule.
Twenty-three years later Mansfield faced an identical issue concern-
ing a stolen bill of exchange.40 3 In Peacock v. Rhodes,404 the bill that had
399. Id. at 399.
400. Id. at 400.
401. Id. at 401.
402. Id In an article published during World War I, it was argued that bona fide purchas-
ers for value of overdue paper should nonetheless take free of equities of ownership (but not
defenses). Z. Chafee, Jr., Rights in Overdue Paper. 31 HAIv. L. REv. 1104, 1108 (1918). In a
Mansfield-like manner, Chafee sorts through analogies: ordinary choses in action, id. at 1105,
chattels, id. at 1106; instruments not overdue, id. at 1106. And like Mansfield, he bases his
ultimate position on policy (encouraging negotiable paper to further the war effort). Id. at
1148.
403. A bill of exchange was an order to pay and would be comparable to a "draft" in
U.C.C. Article 3.
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been issued by Rhodes and indorsed in blank by the payee was stolen
from Fischer. The plaintiff Peacock was a mercer who subsequently took
the bill in exchange for cloth, other articles, cash, and "small bills.''4°5
Peacock presented the note to the drawee, who refused to pay or accept,
and Peacock sued Rhodes as drawer of the bill. At trial it was deter-
mined that the plaintiff had taken the bill "in the course of trade.' 4 6
The facts gave Mansfield an opportunity, which he did not miss, to estab-
lish the "better than" principle for bills and notes.
Miller and Peacock have one striking difference both in the way they
were argued and in the opinion of the court. In Peacock only money and
bank notes were mentioned by way of analogy. There were no refer-
ences to goods, lottery tickets, or any of the other types of property ar-
gued in Miller. It was as if Miller had taken a half-step toward
establishing the "better than" principle for bills and notes, and that the
analogy to bank notes was now sufficient to cover the remaining dis-
tance. Possible connections to other types of property were ignored.
In Peacock the plaintiff argued that bills of exchange indorsed in
blank by the payee were considered cash and "the very object in view, in
making negotiable securities, is, that they serve the purposes of cash." 7
He cited Miller in support of the "principle" of bills being treated as
cash, although he admitted "the question there arose upon a bank-
note."408 His argument illustrates reverse borrowing in that a concept
borrowed from one field of law by another field is used to establish or
support the concept in the originating field of law. In Miller, an analogy
to money was used to establish the "better than" principle with respect
to bank notes. In Peacock, oddly, the plaintiff argued Miller to establish
the "better than" principle with respect to money. Typically reverse bor-
rowing occurs when the original borrowing has been forgotten. In Pea-
cock, the plaintiff used reverse borrowing in his argument despite the
conspicuous nature of the initial borrowing.
The defendant's reply stressed a distinction in commercial practice
between bank notes or banker's cash notes and bills of exchange; "the
404. 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781).
405. The fact that the plaintiff gave smaller bills in change indicates extensive use of bills
of exchange at the time. Other facts of Peacock v. Rhodes also reflect common use. The bill
had been issued August 9, 1780, at Halifax and was payable in 31 days. It was transferred
twice and was in Fisher's possession at York when it was stolen "along with other bills in his
pocket-book." Id. at 402.
406. Id. at 403.
407. Id at 402.
408. Id
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two first sorts only are considered as cash."40 9 He also pointed out, quite
correctly, that in Miller bills of exchange were seen "as only being a se-
curity or document for debt"41 0 and had not been grouped with money
or bank notes but rather with goods and other property that is transfera-
ble but may be recovered if lost or stolen. Finally, the defendant urged
the court to consider the policy consequences of finding for the plaintiff;
"if the law were as contended for on the part of the plaintiff, the tempta-
tions to theft would be increased. '411
Mansfield told the plaintiff a rejoinder was unnecessary and launched
into his opinion: "I am glad this question was 'saved, not for any diffi-
culty there is in the case, but because it is important that general com-
mercial points should be publicly decided. ' 41 2 He stressed the point that
holders of bills of exchange and promissory notes should not be consid-
ered as mere assignees who take "subject to all the equity to which the
original party was subject. '4 13 Instead, bills and notes should be consid-
ered "within the principle of all [the cases plaintiff] has cited, from that
of Miller v. Race, downwards. 4  In Mansfield's relatively brief opinion
there was no analogy to other types of property, and in particular, no
justification for the result based on analogies of cash or goods or bank
notes. He merely cited cases and focused on policy.
Miller and Peacock demonstrate both the importance of other types
of property in establishing the "better than" principle for negotiable in-
struments and the tendency for connections between negotiable instru-
ments and other properties to be overlooked. Perhaps at first the
connections were merely ignored, but later they would be forgotten.
The connections surface only when a case arises at the borders between
types of property.
409. I& at 403.
410. Itt
411. It
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. (emphasis added). In Peacock v. Rhodes, Mansfield extends the "better than"
principle both to bills of exchange and non-bank promissory notes although the case involved
only a bill of exchange. Undoubtedly the primary reason for including both types of docu-
ments was commercial policy, but perhaps an additional reason is hinted at in one of his obser-
vations from an earlier case about reporters:
Upon looking into the reports of the cases on this head, in the times of King William
the Third and Queen Anne, it is difficult to discover by them, when the question arises
upon a bill and when upon a note: for the reporters do not express themselves, with
sufficient precision, but use the words "note" and "bill" promiscuously.
Grant v. Vaughan, 97 Eng. Rep. 957, 961 (K.B. 1764).
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Two areas of property that are different but also connected are goods
and money. In Moss v. Handcock, 15 the respondent, Handcock's butler,
stole a five pound gold piece that had been given to his employer twelve
years before in conjunction with the 1887 Jubilee. The butler changed
the gold coin at the appellant's shop for five sovereigns.416 The appel-
lant Moss was "a dealer in new and second-hand clothes, jewellery, and
other articles. '417 The respondent argued that the gold coin was his
property, it had been stolen, and he was entitled to restitution of the coin
under the Larceny Act.41 8 The appellant replied that the gold piece was
"a current coin having been made so by proclamation, and cannot be
ordered to be restored having once got into circulation ' 419 citing Miller
in support of his argument.
The court had a choice of characterizing the transaction either as a
sale of goods or as a transfer of the coin as currency. As a sale of goods,
the respondent would win since the sale was not in market-overt and the
appellant could take no better right, title, or interest than his transferor,
the thief. If the coin had passed as currency, however, the appellant
would prevail. Judge Darling ruminated, "I ask myself was this gold
piece passed in its character as coin of currency or was it rather the sub-
ject of a sale as an article of vertu?"4 0 Although the coin had been
exchanged for coins of an equal face value, both judges were of the opin-
ion it was a sale of goods and affirmed the lower court's order of restitu-
tion. Several factors apparently influenced the court: the gold coin had
a market value greater than the face amount, the purchaser was a dealer
in new and secondhand jewelry and other articles, and, in the words of
Judge Channell, "it was offered to appellant's son because he dealt in
curiosities and was taken by him as such."42
A more recent case, United States v. Barnard,422 raised a similar issue
about characterizing a coin as cash or goods. In 1933, the Philadelphia
mint produced twenty-dollar gold pieces that were never placed in circu-
lation. Later in the same year, an executive order prohibited any further
415. 80 L.T.R. 693 (Q.B. 1899).
416. Five sovereigns equaled the face amount of the five pound gold coin.
417. Moss, 80 L.T.R. at 693.
418. Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 96, § 100.
419. Moss, 80 L.T.R. at 693.
420. Id. at 694.
421. Id. Judge Channell expressed skepticism about the magistrate's finding that the
transaction was bona fide. Id at 695. The butler had been employed by Handcock for only a
month, the appellant's son knew he was an "indoor servant," and apparently it would be
unusual for a butler to own a coin of this type.
422. 72 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Tenn. 1947).
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issuance of gold coins.413 Two of the coins were delivered to the Smith-
sonian and the rest were to be melted into bullion. In 1944 Barnard, a
numismatist, purchased a 1933 twenty-dollar gold piece from another
collector. The United States sued Bernard in replevin, alleging he was a
purchaser of stolen property. The court was persuaded the coin must
have been stolen by an employee of the mint.4 24
The defendant argued the coin was lawfully minted currency and that
he had purchased it as currency and not as goods. The court, undoubt-
edly echoing arguments by the plaintiff, pointed out that the 1934 Gold
Reserve Act provided that "gold coin may only be acquired and held
when such gold coin is of special recognized value to collectors of rare
and unusual coins."42 Further, the defendant had paid nine hundred
dollars for a coin with a face value of twenty dollars. The court held that
Bernard had purchased the coin as a chattel and granted the govern-
ment's replevin demand.
The court could have reached the same result without characterizing
the coin as a good. It could have found that the coin was currency but
that Bernard was not a bona fide purchaser since he took with notice of
the government's claim.426 A purchaser of money who takes with notice
of a claim takes subject to the claim. In cases involving property at the
borders between types of property, characterization is but one method
of justifying a result. Typically, within each of the property areas there
are alternatives that will allow a court to impose a "same as" position or
a "better than" position. The court in Barnard could have found for the
plaintiff either by characterizing the transaction as a sale of goods or as a
transfer of money to a purchaser who took with notice of the claim.
On the other hand, although there are connections between areas of
property and the negotiability principle is generally available across
property areas, each area will have its own peculiarities. In Barnard, for
example, an argument that the coin was currency but Bernard took with
notice of the claim would be bolstered by the fact that he paid nine hun-
dred dollars for a twenty-dollar coin. The higher the price, the more
probable it would be that he knew the coin had been issued illegally. In
a negotiable instruments case, however, price works in exactly the oppo-
423. Id. at 532.
424. The coins had been weighed after minting and later as bullion and the results were
identical. Apparently the employee had substituted a similar coin with another date. Id. at
531.
425. I,
426. See Case Note, Negotiable Instruments-Innocent Purchaser Receiving Stolen Coin
As Curio-Application of the Law Merchant, 1 VArN. L. R v. 314 (1948).
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site way. In a transfer of a negotiable instrument, the higher the price
relative to the face amount of the instrument, the more likely it is the
purchaser is taking in good faith and without notice of defects.
In goods transactions, although the "same as" principle is the general
rule, there are numerous exceptions. In addition to the concepts dis-
cussed previously,4 7 the estoppel principle implements a negotiability
result in many instances.42 8 Generally the common law has been more
protective of the true owner of goods than the civil law.429 For example,
in civil law if the true owner allows another person to use goods and the
goods are sold without authority, the purchaser takes free of the true
owner's claim.43° Under the common law, however, merely entrusting
goods to another does not give the entrustee the power to deliver the
entruster's title.43' But in the common law, entrusting, plus something
else, may estop the true owner from recovering against a purchaser. En-
trusting goods and delivering a document indicating the entrustee owns
the goods, for example, is usually sufficient for a good faith purchaser to
establish estoppel.432
In O'Connor's v. Clark,433 the property transferred was indisputably
goods, but within the rules applied to goods the facts were located at the
border between estoppel and nonestoppel cases. O'Connor owned a
wagon and allowed Tracy to use it in his business-a fact insufficient on
its own to create an estoppel. But O'Connor also allowed Tracy to paint
"George Tracy, Piano Mover" on the wagon.434 Tracy sold the wagon to
the defendant without authority from O'Connor, who sued in replevin.
Had O'Connor merely entrusted the wagon, Tracy could have told a po-
tential buyer he was the owner, and O'Connor would not have been es-
topped. However, allowing the wagon to speak was a different matter.
The court held that because the buyer had bought the wagon in good
faith and had been misled by the circumstances into believing Tracy was
the owner, O'Connor was estopped. The result makes this particular
wagon as negotiable as a negotiable instrument.
427. See supra notes 130-215 and accompanying text.
428. See Ewart, supra note 69, for an attempt to create an estoppel theory of negotiability.
429. See POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 390, at 154-55.
430. Id
431. The entrustment rule in U.C.C. § 2-403(2) is a notable exception.
432. In Nixon v. Brown, 57 N.H. 34 (1876), the plaintiff authorized his agent to purchase a
horse and keep possession of the horse and bill of sale, which was in the agent's name. When
the agent sold the horse to the defendant without authority, the plaintiff was estopped.
433. 32 A. 1029 (Pa. 1895).
434. Id at 1030.
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Since the negotiability principle evolved in an atmosphere of borrow-
ing across property areas and is an option generally available in each
area, it is of fundamental importance to recognize the connections be-
tween these areas. Cultivating these connections exposes anomalies and
may assist a court or legislature in resolving questions about a trans-
feree's right, title, or interest. For instance, in 1990 the Permanent Edi-
torial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code faced a thorny Article 9
priority question concerning cash proceeds.43 5 The issue arises when a
cash payment from an account debtor4 36 is paid to a secured party with a
junior priority position.4 37 The question is whether the secured party is
required to turn over the payment to the secured party with a senior
position. In its discussion, the P.E.B. first asked what the outcome
would be if the payment had been made by check and then took the
position that the same result should apply to cash.438 The result turns on
"whether B received the payment in good faith and without knowledge
or reason to know of [the competing] security interest."439 In other
words, a court faced with the issue should apply the holder in due course
principle by analogy; "[o]therwise, cash would be rendered less negotia-
ble than a check."4'
Another instance of clear-eyed borrowing across property lines is the
treatment of "symbolic writings" under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, which borrows the merger principle441 from negotiable instru-
ments and donor/donee concepts from goods. As a general rule, gratui-
tous assignment of contract rights are revocable by the assignor and the
death or incapacity of the assignor revokes the assignee's rights.44  An
exception makes the assignment irrevocable if "the assignment is accom-
435. Proceeds are defined in U.C.C. § 9-306(1) as "whatever is received upon the sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds.... Money, checks, deposit
accounts, and the like are 'cash proceeds."'
436. An "account debtor" in Article 9 is a "person who is obligated on an account, chattel
paper or general intangible." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a).
437. The payment could be made directly from the account debtor to the secured party or
the account debtor could make the payment to the debtor who then remits the payment to the
secured party.
438. Permanent Editorial Board Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, Com-
mentary No. 7, The Relative Priorities of Security Interests in the Cash Proceeds of Accounts,
Chattel Paper, and General Intangibles (1990).
439. Id.
440. Id
441. The merger rule provides that when a negotiable instrument is taken for an obliga-
tion, the obligation is merged in the instrument. The rule is a mechanism for giving tangible
form to an otherwise incorporeal obligation. See U.C.C. § 3-310.
442. R=ATEMENT (ScoND) oF CoNTRAcrs § 332(2) (1981).
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panied by delivery of a writing of the type customarily accepted as a
symbol or as evidence of the right assigned."4 3 Symbolic writings in-
clude negotiable instruments and non-negotiable writings such as docu-
ments of title, securities, and chattel paper as well as other symbols such
as savings account bank books.4" The Restatement comments on the
symbolic writing exception: "A gift of a right embodied in such a writing
may be made by delivery in accordance with rules governing gifts of
chattels by delivery."'
Historically, the merger rule developed in an atmosphere of borrow-
ing among five different areas of property: coin, bank notes, goods, ne-
gotiable instruments, and contract rights. In English law goods were the
bedrock of transferability and merger, because goods have always been
transferable. Coin also could be transferred since it was considered
goods,4' but incorporeal rights could not be assigned.447 The merger
rule of negotiable instruments originated as a fiction-incorporeal rights
were embodied in a document and the document, being a good, could be
transferred." 8 The merger rule became the mechanism for transferring
incorporeal rights by giving them tangible form.449 At about the same
time, the Bank of England began issuing fully transferable bank notes.450
443. Id at § 332 (1)(b). See also CopwrN, supra note 291, at 645.
444. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTS, § 332 cmt. c (1981).
445. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provision about discharge of an obligor
after an assignment of rights also uses symbolic writings to create an exception to the general
rule. See id. § 338(4).
446. See Waterman, supra note 364, at 315.
447. See, e.g., CoRmrN, supra note 291, at 423. Holdsworth provides the following expla-
nation of the impediments to assigning contract rights:
In ancient law anything approaching a negotiable instrument was legally impossible, for
three reasons. Firstly, ancient systems of law do not allow one man to represent an-
other in litigation before a tribunal.... Secondly, ancient systems of law do not allow a
creditor to assign his right to another. That the relation of debtor and creditor was a
strictly personal relation is obvious from the strictly personal character of the creditor's
remedy-he could even imprison the debtor. Therefore it was only just that the credi-
tor and the creditor alone should be able to enforce his claim. Thirdly, such a transfer,
even if otherwise permissible, was impossible, because there could be no transfer of
anything without a physical delivery of possession; and how can the right to enforce the
payment of a debt be physically transferred?
Holdsworth, supra note 293, at 115.
448. See, supra notes 292-97 and accompanying text.
449. Negotiable instruments law is capable of remembering that the merger rule is a fic-
tion. If your bicycle is stolen you cannot ride it anymore, but if a negotiable instrument is
stolen (or lost or destroyed) the owner can still bring an action on the instrument. See U.C.C.
§ 3-312.
450. The Bank of England first issued bank notes in 1694. Waterman, supra note 364, at
321.
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When courts and legislatures ignore or forget connections between
areas of property, peculiar anomalies can result. For example, from 1956
to 1972 the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code made chattel
paper (which is non-negotiable) more negotiable on a particular issue
than negotiable instruments. In 1956 U.C.C. section 9-308 was amended
to provide as follows:
A purchaser of chattel paper or a non-negotiable instrument who
gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course
of his business and without knowledge that the specific paper or
instrument is subject to a security interest has priority over a se-
curity interest which is perfected under Section 9-304 (permissive
filing and temporary perfection). A purchaser of chattel paper
who gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary
course of his business has priority over a security interest in chat-
tel paper which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject
to a security interest (Section 9-306), even though he knows that
the specific paper is subject to the security interest.451
The amended version protected purchasers of chattel paper against com-
peting proceeds of inventory claims even though the purchaser took with
knowledge of the competing interest. A purchaser of a negotiable in-
strument, however, who took under similar circumstances would take
subject to the interest.452
The anomaly was not repaired until 1972 when the protection of sec-
tion 9-308 was extended to purchasers of negotiable instruments.453 The
official comment on the 1972 amendment stated that section 9-308 had
been "rewritten for clarity" and acknowledged that in the prior version
"the holder of a negotiable instrument was in some circumstances in a
less protected position against competing claims than the holder of chat-
tel paper."454
The 1956 version of section 9-308 contained another anomaly, appar-
ently unnoticed by the drafters of the 1972 revision, that was corrected
inadvertently.455 This second anomaly made nonnegotiable Article 9 in-
451. U.C.C. § 9-308 (1956). See 18 Uromaom CO mMERCAL CODE DRAFTs 284-85 (Eliza-
beth Slusser Kelly compiler, 1984) [hereinafter Kelly].
452. A U.C.C. Article 9 security interest is a "claim" in Article 3. A purchaser of a nego-
tiable instrument who takes with notice of a claim is not a holder in due course and a
nonholder in due course takes subject to all claims to the instrument. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-
306, 9-309.
453. The 1972 revision is currently the recommended section. See U.C.C. § 9-308.
454. U.C.C. 1972 Official Text Showing Changes Made in Former text of Article 9, Se-
cured Transactions, and of Related Sections and Reasons for Changes § 9-308 (1972).
455. The second anomaly is not mentioned in the comments to the 1972 revision.
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struments456 more negotiable in certain instances than negotiable instru-
ments. A purchaser of a nonnegotiable instrument who "gives new
value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business
and without knowledge that the specific... instrument is subject to a
security interest" 457 was protected by the 1956 version against competing
Article 9 interests perfected by filing or perfected automatically under
subsections 9-304(4) or (5). In a comparable situation, a purchaser of a
negotiable instrument who took without notice of the competing interest
might be disqualified from holder in due course status for other reasons
(e.g., she took with notice of overdueness). In Article 3 a nonholder in
due course takes subject to all claims.4 58
To illustrate, assume a secured party has an interest perfected by pos-
session in two items of collateral: a negotiable instrument and a non-
negotiable Article 9 instrument. Both are payable on demand and some-
what stale. Both are returned to the debtor to be presented for payment
to the account debtor. Instead, the debtor immediately sells both to a
purchaser who gives new value, takes possession in the ordinary course
of her business, and without knowledge of the security interest. It ap-
pears that under the prior 9-308, the purchaser would take the non-nego-
tiable instrument free of the competing interest but would take the
negotiable instrument subject to the interest. A court faced with this
question could have used the "ordinary course of his business" require-
ment to make the results consistent, but it could have just as easily pro-
tected the purchaser as to the non-negotiable instrument but not as to
the negotiable instrument. The statutory anomaly could have easily
been avoided if the drafters of the 1956 version had looked at the con-
nections between chattel paper, non-negotiable Article 9 instruments,
and negotiable instruments and been aware of the broad use of the nego-
tiability principle.
Anomalies can be found throughout the Uniform Commercial Code
and in other statutory and common law systems governing the transfer
of interests in property. Usually they result from a failure to see connec-
tions between types of property, but sometimes they are intentional. A
check or other negotiable draft is not an assignment and gives the holder
456. The U.C.C. Article 9 definition of instruments includes all Article 3 negotiable in-
struments and also extends to certified securities and "any other writing which evidences a
right to the payment of money and is not itself a security interest or lease and is of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery ...." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i).
457. Kelly, supra note 451, at 285.
458. U.C.C. § 3-306.
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no rights against the drawee,459 but an assignment of rights under a sim-
ple contract does give the assignee rights against the obligor.460
U.C.C. Article 4 applies to all items, whether negotiable or not, and
provides several rules more generous than their Article 3 counterparts.
A collecting bank can give value by merely promising to allow its cus-
tomer to withdraw a provisional settlement, whether or not the customer
in fact withdraws the funds. 461 In Article 3 a mere promise to perform is
not value.46a In Article 4 a depositary bank becomes a holder of an item
when its customer, who was a holder, transfers the item to the bank,
even without the customer's indorsement.463 In Article 3 a transferee of
an order instrument without indorsement is not entitled to holder sta-
tus.464 These anomalies were created intentionally in response to argu-
ments by the banking industry that both rules are necessary to a large
volume check collection and payment system. The interesting point is
how easily the wall around negotiable instruments can be breached when
another area of property is attracted to the negotiability principle.465
CONCLUSION
A spectrum theory of negotiability allows an escape from the dualism
that has dominated commercial paper scholarship and pedagogy. It ex-
poses connections between negotiable instruments and other types of
property and exhibits the full spectrum of "better than" and "worse
than" positions utilized by courts and legislatures. Further, a spectrum
theory shows that whenever property is transferred, the transferee does
not automatically receive the right, title, and interest of the transferor.
Negotiability should in fact be of interest to anyone investigating the
transfer of property interests.
In the past, commercial paper scholarship has asked the negotiability
question in a way that seeks a definite answer and attempts closure on
the issue. A spectrum theory offers an alternative way of asking the ne-
gotiability question; a method of inquiry that reveals the issue of negoti-
ability can be an open and an interesting question.
459. U.C.C. § 3-408.
460. See CoRDiN, supra note 291, at 536.
461. U.C.C. § 4-210(a)(2).
462. U.C.C. § 3-303(a)(1).
463. U.C.C. § 4-205.
464. U.C.C. §§ 3-201(a), 3-203(c).
465. See Dwight A. Olds, Should Negotiable Instruments Suffer Disadvantages Not Shared
by Non-Negotiable Choses in Action, 2 Hous. L. Rav. 43 (1964), for a rare discussion of nego-
tiability anomalies.
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